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TIMING IS EVERYTHING: 
MARKETS, LOSS, AND PROOF OF CAUSATION 




Plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions must prove that defendants’ 
misconduct caused the investors’ losses.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 
decision in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. reaffirmed that loss 
causation is a quintessential merits issue that must be decided at trial.  In 
three recent trials, juries have held defendants liable with findings of fact 
that are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework for 
securities fraud causation.  This Note examines these verdicts and 
encourages the courts to depart from the common law of fraud and tighten 
the meaning of causation.  To do this, courts must adhere to the economic 
theory that sustains modern class actions.  Because losing parties will 
invariably move for post-trial relief, courts should develop rules that 
incorporate conceptual clarity and well-defined mechanisms of proof. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In its most recent pronouncement on causation in securities fraud, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs do not need to prove loss causation 
as a prerequisite to class certification.1  Instead, the Court reaffirmed that 
loss causation, which “requires a plaintiff to show that a misrepresentation 
that affected the integrity of the market price also caused a subsequent 
economic loss,”2 is a quintessential merits issue.  The unanimous Court 
repudiated the Fifth Circuit’s approach to loss causation,3
 
 1. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 but the decision 
did not address problematic issues of proof that emerged following several 
recent mega-trials.  Causation played a prominent role in each of these 
verdicts, and because of its conceptual sophistication, it is an intensely 
litigated issue.  This Note argues that loss causation is the overriding issue 
in securities class actions, and it suggests some conceptual guidelines for 
 2. Id. at 2186. 
 3. See id. 
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courts to consider when ruling on post-trial issues of proof.  This Note 
urges the courts to develop bright-line rules requiring plaintiffs to identify 
the mechanisms that reveal the truth of concealed fraud to the markets. 
This Note focuses on class actions, the most prominent remedy for 
aggrieved investors.  Class actions brought pursuant to the federal securities 
laws have astonishing economic impact, and have been referred to as the 
“800-pound gorilla” dwarfing all other class actions.4  These claims 
typically arise under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 
(‘34 Act) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-56 
(Rule 10b-5), the predominant antifraud provisions of the federal regulatory 
scheme.7  This framework permits plaintiffs to sue the issuers of securities 
for disseminating false or misleading public statements that cause economic 
loss.8  Courts fashioned an implied private right of action from Section 
10(b) of the ‘34 Act, and shaped its contours with principles of common 
law fraud.9  Securities class actions differ from common law fraud, 
however, and feature special rules.10
Because Rule 10b-5 broadly proscribes fraudulent conduct, it is the most 
robust legal remedy available to investors.
 
11  Since 1996, plaintiffs have 
filed more than 3200 securities class actions in the federal courts.12
 
 4. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:  An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1539 (2006); see also Ann Morales 
Olazábal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 337, 339 (2006) (characterizing the securities fraud class action as a 
“viciously fought ‘money race’”). 
  These 
actions have massive economic consequences.  From 1997 through 2009, 
corporate class action defendants have lost a total annual average of $133 
billion in market capitalization following the final corrective disclosure of 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). 
 6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 7. See 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
§ 12.3[1], at 518–19 (6th ed. 2009). 
 8. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 339 (2005). 
 9. See generally 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[3], at 522–29; infra Part I.A.  The 
courts have read the elements of common law fraud into Rule 10b-5 claims. See Dura, 544 
U.S. at 342 (requiring loss causation); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232, 243 (1988) 
(requiring reliance and materiality); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 
(1977) (requiring deception and manipulation); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 
212–14 (1976) (requiring scienter, a wrongful mental state).  An omission is material if 
“‘there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important.’” Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 439 (1976)). 
 10. Securities class actions differ from common law misrepresentation and deceit 
actions, and securities laws were partially designed to supplement common law remedies. 
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243–44, 244 n.22 (“The modern securities markets, literally involving 
millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face transactions 
contemplated by early fraud cases . . . .”). 
 11. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[2], at 520–21. 
 12. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS:  2010 YEAR IN 
REVIEW 3 (2011), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/News/df1151e6-dee6-447a-
a125-6e5ced949877/Presentation/NewsAttachment/789fd0d2-16c4-4bdc-b29d-
bc0f4ed9c622/Cornerstone_Research_Filings_2010_YIR.pdf.  This total is current through 
December 31, 2010. Id. 
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class periods.13  This loss in market capitalization does not easily translate 
into a measure of damages that plaintiffs could recover in subsequent 
litigation, however.14  Determining damages across lengthy class periods is 
a far more challenging endeavor, and a conceptual focus of this Note.15
The Supreme Court directly addressed loss causation before Halliburton.  
In a 2005 decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Court 
unanimously held that overpaying for a stock that was distorted by fraud is 
not sufficient to plead the element of loss causation.
 
16  A mere drop in stock 
price following the revelation of a concealed truth is insufficient to establish 
loss causation.17  The Court held that there must be a “causal connection 
between the material misrepresentation and the loss.”18  As the Court 
observed, drops in stock price can be caused by any number of factors, and 
fraud is only one of them.19
While the Dura decision provided the lower courts with some guidance, 
the decision only addressed pleading standards; courts continue to struggle 
with loss causation’s standard of proof.
 
20  In addition to proving that the 
investor purchased the security at a distorted price, courts interpret Dura to 
require plaintiffs to prove not only that the stock price declined after the 
truth made its way to the marketplace, but that the decline was not a result 
of some factor other than fraud.21  Courts have recognized various theories 
of proof that allegations of fraud actually and proximately caused losses.22  
Expert testimony plays the critical role in establishing causal links; the 
strength of an expert’s damages model can determine the survival of a 
plaintiff’s case.23  These requirements raise difficult issues of proof, making 
loss causation one of the most heavily litigated issues in modern securities 
fraud.24
 
 13. See id. at 2 (using the disclosure dollar loss method to estimate the impact of 
information revealed at the end of the class period). 
 
 14. See id. at 24. 
 15. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class 
Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 349–50 (2007) (“[N]o coherent doctrinal statement 
exists . . . .”); see also infra Part II.D. 
 16. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005) (rejecting the 
“purchase price inflation” theory previously endorsed by the Ninth Circuit). 
 17. Id. at 342. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 343 (“Given the tangle of factors affecting price, the most logic alone permits 
us to say is that the higher purchase price will sometimes play a role in bringing about a 
future loss.”); see infra Part III (discussing the various factors that impact the market price of 
a security). 
 20. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 347; Olazábal, supra note 4, at 339; see also Merritt B. Fox, 
After Dura:  Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. L. 829, 865–66 (2006) 
(discussing causation issues undecided by Dura). 
 21. See infra Part III; see also Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–43. 
 22. See infra Part III; see also David Tabak, Inflation and Damages in a Post-Dura 
World 1–3 (Nat’l Econ. Research Assoc., Working Paper, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017334 (discussing inflation modeling 
methodologies). 
 23. See Robert Pietrzak & Daniel A. McLaughlin, Loss Causation Experts After Dura, 
LAW360 (May 21, 2009), http://www.law360.com/web/articles/99821. 
 24. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 339. 
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Though few securities class actions proceed to trial,25 several recent 
verdicts produced results that are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Dura.26
This Note begins by examining the essential tools that inform the causation 
analysis.  Part I considers the history and remedial purpose of the federal 
securities laws.  Part I then focuses on the history of the causation element, 
the economic theory underlying proof of loss causation, and the 
maintenance of class actions.  Part II addresses the Supreme Court’s 
causation decisions in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,
  This Note encourages the lower courts to fashion rules 
that prevent conflicts between the economic theory supporting the Supreme 
Court’s class action and causation jurisprudence, and mechanisms of proof. 
27
 Since causation and damages are inextricable, jury verdicts must not 
depart from the expert testimony proffered at trial.  These results do not 
further the goals of the securities laws, and more directed efforts to 
streamline the process should yield more accurate verdicts.  When deciding 
post-trial motions, the courts should rely on the economic theory supporting 
the class device as guide to proof of causation.  Courts should reject 
verdicts in favor of parties that do not put forth sufficient evidence 
connecting investor losses to disclosures that initially distort market price 
with those disclosures that reveal the nature of the fraud to the market.  This 
 Dura, and Halliburton.  
Those three decisions provide the legal framework for the causation 
analysis; this Note next examines more practical considerations.  In Part III, 
this Note discusses the evidentiary aspects of loss causation.  Part IV of this 
Note urges the courts to tighten the loss causation analysis to remain 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework. 
 
 25. Only eleven securities fraud class actions have reached jury verdicts based on 
conduct occurring after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See 
Adam T. Savett, Securities Class Action Trials Post-PSLRA Era (Sept. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.box.net/shared/xxav75dzpf. 
 26. The jury entered a mixed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in Lawrence E. Jaffe 
Pension Plan v. Household International, Inc. on May 7, 2009. 756 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930 
(N.D. Ill. 2010); see also Kevin LaCroix, Plaintiffs Prevail in Mixed Jury Verdict in 
Household International Securities Fraud Trial, D&O DIARY (May 7, 2009), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/05/articles/securities-litigation/plaintiffs-prevail-in-mixed-
jury-verdict-in-household-international-securities-fraud-trial/.  The jury entered a plaintiffs’ 
verdict in In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation on January 29, 2010. 765 F. 
Supp. 2d 512, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Nathan Koppel, Viva Vivendi!  New York 
Plaintiffs’ Firms Score Huge Verdict, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 29, 2010, 5:31 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/29/viva-vivendi-new-york-plaintiffs-firms-score-huge-
verdict/ (noting that damages could total $9 billion).  Lastly, the Ninth Circuit restored a 
plaintiffs’ verdict in In re Apollo Group, Inc. Securities Litigation that the district court had 
vacated. No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988, at *1 (9th Cir. June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1602 (2011).  The Supreme Court denied certiorari on two issues in that case—
whether a corrective disclosure must reveal new information, and the length of time in which 
the market must respond to corrective information. Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policeman’s Annuity 
& Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (denying certiorari); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
i, Apollo Grp., Inc. (Nov. 15, 2010) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *i; see also infra 
Part III.E (discussing these verdicts).  The jury in In re BankAtlantic Bancorp., Inc. 
Securities Litigation returned a mixed verdict in favor of the defendants on November 10, 
2010. See No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 1585605, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011); see also 
infra notes 324, 337. 
 27. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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necessarily requires identification of the mechanism that revealed the fraud, 
and proof that it caused a loss. 
I.  CAUSATION IN SECURITIES LAW:  EARLY REGULATION, MARKET 
EFFICIENCY, AND THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE 
Loss causation evolved over many years.  Since causation is essential to a 
claim, it is important to understand the background of the securities laws 
and the common law’s influence on private securities actions.  This part 
first reviews the history of the securities laws and examines the early loss 
causation cases.  It then examines the economic theory that eventually 
allowed plaintiffs to overcome a longstanding hurdle to class certification.  
These concepts coalesce into proof of causation by establishing the effect of 
disclosure on the market price of a security, and thus the amount of 
damages the fraudulent conduct caused. 
A.  The Realization of an Ancient Truth:   
The Promulgation of the Federal Securities Laws 
The federal securities laws are the product of our nation’s greatest 
financial catastrophe—the Great Depression.28  But the first calls for 
securities regulation occurred during an economic crisis that took place over 
twenty years before the October 1929 stock market crash.  Following the 
Panic of 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt implored Congress to remedy 
egregious practices on Wall Street.29  Widespread abuses included the 
manipulation of the price of securities to corner commodities markets.30  
Despite investigations that exposed these corrupt practices, Congress failed 
to enact any legislation after the Panic of 1907.31
In the years leading up to the Great Depression, the stock markets grew 
rapidly.
 
32  Trading became extremely profitable, and unsophisticated 
investors playing the market conducted minimal investigation while 
assuming massive risk.33  In addition to the lingering problem of 
speculation,34
 
 28. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 407 (1990).  The Panic of 1907 resulted from a loss of investor 
confidence in New York banks following concern over the banks’ involvement in a market 
manipulation scandal. See id. at 395. 
 reformers suspected that brokers and underwriters distributed 
 29. See id. at 396.  According to President Roosevelt, “There is no moral difference 
between gambling at cards or in lotteries or on the race track and gambling in the stock 
market.” Id. (quoting 42 CONG. REC. 1347, 1349 (1908)). 
 30. Id. at 399.  Former New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes appointed a state 
committee to investigate speculation in the market, defined at the time as “forecasting 
changes of value and buying or selling in order to take advantage of them.” See id. at 397.  
Rather than a deliberate, informed investment, the Hughes Committee focused on trading 
activity “with a view to profiting from price changes.” Id. 
 31. See id. at 396–97 (“The government’s most important response to the panic was to 
investigate.”). 
 32. See id. at 406–07. 
 33. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 5–6 (6th 
ed. 2009). 
 34. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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securities through false, opaque, or otherwise inadequate disclosures.35  A 
significant portion of these transactions in securities were “on margin,” 
where an investor borrows much of the stock’s purchase price.36  When the 
markets ultimately slowed down, lenders began calling debt.37  Financially 
strained investors sold securities en masse, depressing market prices.38  The 
speculation bubble had burst; investor confidence disappeared, and the 
markets soon failed.39  Speculative trading, coupled with inadequate 
diligence and poor disclosure, doomed Wall Street.40  These events 
substantially caused the stock market crash of 1929 that kick-started the 
Great Depression.41
The congressional response to the 1929 crash primarily sought to prevent 
another market meltdown.
 
42  Sensational investigations into Wall Street 
practices exposed pervasive short-selling and price manipulation tactics.43  
After the election of 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s incoming 
administration urged remedial legislation.44  The proposed regulations 
would have to balance the elimination of economically destructive behavior 
with preserving investors’ ability to conduct free market transactions.45  
Roosevelt introduced securities legislation that he hoped would restore the 
“ancient truth” that market participants handling other people’s money are 
trustees who must act in good faith.46
Congress soon passed the Securities Act of 1933
 
47 (‘33 Act), which 
regulated the distribution of securities by encouraging disclosure of 
information pertinent to the investment.48  The ‘33 Act was premised on the 
assumption that if stock prices are determined by public perception, and 
public perception is clearer with thorough and accurate disclosure of 
information about the issuer, securities legislation should strive to ensure 
full and adequate disclosure.49
 
 35. See COX ET AL., supra note 
  Another legislative purpose of the ‘33 Act 
33, at 6. 
 36. Id. at 5. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 5–6. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id.; 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3], at 34. 
 42. See Thel, supra note 28, at 409. 
 43. See id. at 410–13. 
 44. See id. at 414–15. 
 45. See id. at 397–98. 
 46. See 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (message of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt). 
 47. 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)). 
 48. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3][A], at 35–36. See generally Milton H. Cohen, 
“Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966); John H. Walsh, A Simple 
Code of Ethics:  A History of the Moral Purpose Inspiring Federal Regulation of the 
Securities Industry, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2001) (providing a history of the purposes of 
the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts). 
 49. See Thel, supra note 28, at 409. 
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was to deter misconduct.50  The ‘33 Act proscribed fraud in connection 
with public offerings and provided remedies for purchasers of securities.51
Congress’s work was not done.  The ‘34 Act followed, with much 
broader protections for both purchasers and sellers.
   
52  The ‘34 Act regulated 
all aspects of trading on the marketplace, and imposed periodic disclosure 
requirements on any company whose stock is listed on a national 
exchange.53  The ‘34 Act provided sweeping protections of investors 
through a philosophy of mandatory disclosure.54  To implement these 
policies, Section 4(a) of the ‘34 Act created the SEC.55  Section 10(b) 
contains the ‘34 Act’s strongest antifraud provision56 and affords the SEC 
wide discretion to promulgate rules in furtherance of Section 10(b)’s 
legislative purpose.57
Section 10(b) ultimately provided the statutory basis for the modern 
securities class action, though it contained no express right of action.
 
58  In 
1942, pursuant to its rulemaking authority conferred by Section 10(b), the 
SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 as a general antifraud provision.59
 
 50. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727–28 (1975); 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); cf. Stoneridge Inv. 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 174 nn.9–10 (2008). 
  Rule 
 51. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 1340–41; see also 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3][A], 
at 36. 
 52. 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006)); see 
Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151; 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3][B], at 36–37. 
 53. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.2[3][B], at 37–38. 
 54. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977)); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727–28; In re 
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); H.R. REP. 
NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934). 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). 
 56. Section 10(b) states in part: 
  It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of . . . any 
facility of any national securities exchange . . . 
  (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Id. § 78j. 
 57. See id.; 1 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1.3, at 53. 
 58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks:  Implied Rights of 
Action Under the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62, 65 (2004); see also Blue 
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 729 (“Nor does the history of this provision provide any indication 
that Congress considered the problem of private suits under it at the time of its passage.”).  
Section 10(b)’s regulatory counterpart, Rule 10b-5, similarly contains no express right of 
action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 59. Rule 10b-5 states in part: 
  It shall be unlawful for any person . . . by the use of . . . any facility or any 
national securities exchange, 
  (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
  (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or  
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10b-5’s reach extends to all misstatements made in connection with a 
purchase or sale of a security.60  The SEC did not originally envision the 
rule to confer a private right of action,61 but courts have long held that Rule 
10b-5 permits plaintiffs to sustain a claim for securities fraud.62
Rule 10b-5 remains the most potent weapon of enforcement for a 
securities plaintiff.
 
63  Private actions promote the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts’ 
objectives of deterring corporate misconduct, as well as making whole 
those who have been duped by corporate deceit.64  Since a private action 
arising under Rule 10b-5 is a judicial creation, the courts initially defined its 
elements of proof.65  Plaintiffs asserting claims pursuant to Section 10(b) of 
the ‘34 Act and Rule 10b-5 must prove six elements:  (1) a material 
misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) damages; and (6) loss 
causation, defined as a “causal connection between the material 
misrepresentation and the loss.”66  This Note focuses on the causation 
element, which was codified in 199567
B.  Loss Causation:  The New Gatekeeper 
 but had its genesis in the common 
law. 
Loss causation was first recognized as a distinct element of securities 
fraud in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. in 1974.68  Since then, loss 
causation has presented conceptual difficulties that plague courts and 
litigants.69
 
  (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
  Although it may be conceptually elusive, loss causation begins 
when fraud drives a stock price above its intrinsic worth, and as a 
consequence, a buyer overpays for the stock but is subsequently unable to 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[2], at 521. 
 60. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 630 (3d ed. 2009); 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[2], at 521. 
 61. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 60, at 630. 
 62. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 515 (E.D. Pa. 1946); see also 
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is now 
established that a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).”). 
 63. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[2], at 521 & n.24.  Courts initially took a liberal 
view of the implied right, but Supreme Court decisions beginning with Blue Chip Stamps 
limited the scope of Rule 10b-5 claims. See 421 U.S. at 737 (noting that private Rule 10b-5 
actions are a “judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”). See 
generally 3 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.3[3]. 
 64. See COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 727–29.  The right of aggrieved plaintiffs to act as 
private attorneys general is a “necessary supplement” to SEC enforcement actions. See Blue 
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)). 
 65. See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-
Based Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 33 (2008). 
 66. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005); supra note 9. 
 67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006). 
 68. See 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974); Fry, supra note 65, at 33. 
 69. See Michael J. Kaufman, Loss Causation:  Exposing a Fraud on Securities Law 
Jurisprudence, 24 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1991) (collecting authority that describes 
causation, among other things,  as “ungainly” and “confusing”). 
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recover that overpayment in the market.70  This overpayment distorts the 
true value of the security, and the difference between the intrinsic worth of 
the stock and its market price is commonly referred to as inflation.71  When 
the truth of the fraud is revealed, plaintiffs must tie their alleged losses to 
both the initial misstatement that distorted the market price, as well as to the 
later disclosure of the fraud.72  Though loss causation is still not uniformly 
understood, this section reviews the history of the causation element and its 
origins at common law.73
Loss causation, as modern courts understand it, was not always an 
element in Rule 10b-5 cases.
 
74  The traditional causation analysis 
considered whether the plaintiff engaged in the securities transaction in 
reliance on a defendant’s misstatement.75  Early securities class actions 
indicated that causation required something more than reliance, but those 
courts did not indicate the nature of the additional proof.76  Without the 
additional proof, the courts reasoned, a defendant would be liable to anyone 
that relied on the misstatement as a cause of the transaction no matter the 
reasons for the loss.77  Finally, in 1974, the Second Circuit bifurcated 
causation in Schlick.78  This decision is widely cited as the first to separate 
individual reliance, which occurs when “the violations in question caused 
the [purchaser] to engage in the transaction in question,” from loss 
causation, where “the misrepresentations or omissions caused the economic 
harm.”79
Unlike the Schlick court, the Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean court 
provided some guidance for proof of loss causation.
 
80  In Huddleston, the 
Fifth Circuit reversed a district court decision not to instruct the jury on 
both reliance and loss causation.81  The court defined loss causation as the 
plaintiff’s proof that “the untruth was in some reasonably direct, or 
proximate, way responsible for his loss.”82
 
 70. Madge S. Thorsen et al., Rediscovering the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 J. BUS. 
& SEC. L. 93, 94–95 (2006). 
  Thus, to prove causation, a 
 71. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1. 
 72. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005). 
 73. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern:  Causation and Federal Securities 
Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 815 (2009). 
 74. See Fox, supra note 20, at 834–35. 
 75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (listing the elements of common 
law fraudulent misrepresentation); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243–44 
(1988). 
 76. See Fox, supra note 20, at 835. 
 77. See id. at 834–36 (quoting Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1292 
(2d Cir. 1969) (observing that a defendant could be liable “to all the world”)). 
 78. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380–81 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 79. See id. (noting that loss causation is demonstrated “rather easily” by proof of 
economic damage); Fisch, supra note 73, at 816–17 (“The court—citing almost no 
authority—explained that causation consists of two distinct components . . . .”). 
 80. See 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 459 U.S. 375 
(1983); Fox, supra note 20, at 836. 
 81. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549–50.  Courts often interchange transaction causation and 
reliance when describing “but-for,” or actual, causation. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 338–42 (2005); Fox, supra note 20, at 842. 
 82. See Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549 & n.24. 
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plaintiff must prove that he would not have completed the transaction if he 
knew the truth, and that the misrepresentation must “touch[] upon the 
reasons for the investment’s decline.”83
These “twin requirements” of loss causation and transaction causation are 
now firmly established in case law,
 
84 but courts applied these standards 
inconsistently in the years following Schlick.85  Fortunately, modern courts 
have provided litigants with more concrete guidance.  Courts analyze 
causation as three discrete yet related concepts.86  First, loss causation is 
sometimes used to describe individual reliance—whether a plaintiff actually 
relied on material misstatements to invest in a company’s stock.87  Reliance 
is also known as “transaction causation.”88  While transaction causation is 
an independent element of a securities fraud claim,89 it is entwined with the 
elements of materiality, loss causation, and damages.90  These elements all 
support the same substantive issue:  the amount of inflation that a 
misrepresentation causes, and therefore the amount that a plaintiff purchaser 
overpays.91  Reliance in securities class actions typically is satisfied by 
asserting the “fraud on the market” (FOTM) theory, discussed in Part II of 
this Note.92
Secondly, loss causation refers to the but for causal relationship between 
the alleged misconduct and the shareholder’s loss.
 
93  Under this approach, 
some portion of a plaintiff’s loss must be attributable to a defendant’s 
misstatements or omissions; in other words, the misstatements must be a 
cause-in-fact of the loss.94  This form of loss causation requires plaintiffs to 
show a sufficient connection tying the fraudulent conduct with the harm 
suffered.95  The mechanism of proof is a corrective disclosure, an event that 
reveals the fraud that the original misstatement concealed.96
 
 83. See id. at 549. 
 
 84. See Fox, supra note 20, at 837. 
 85. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 345. 
 86. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509–10 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(distinguishing between different types of loss causation).  This section focuses primarily on 
the law of the Second Circuit, the preeminent arbiter of securities disputes. See Jordan Milev 
et al., Nat’l Econ. Research Assoc., Trends 2010 Year-End Update:  Securities Class Action 
Filings Accelerate in Second Half of 2010; Median Settlement at an All-Time High 4 (2010), 
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Year_End_Trends_1210.pdf (noting that of the twelve 
federal circuits, the Second Circuit saw the most securities class action filings from 2006–
09). 
 87. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509–10.  Reliance concerns the causal relationship 
between the misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s decision to buy or sell. See infra Part II.A. 
 88. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509–10; see also infra Part II.A. 
 89. See McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 90. See Fox, supra note 20, at 845. 
 91. See id.; infra Part II.E. 
 92. See infra Part II.A (discussing the presumption of reliance and the elements of fraud 
on the market).  
 93. In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 510. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. (quoting Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir. 2007)); 
see infra Part III.C. 
 96. See infra Part III.C (discussing the different types of theories of loss causation). 
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Some commentators refer to this approach as “strict” loss causation.97  If 
the value of the security does not decline as a direct result of the 
misrepresentation, there can be no loss attributable to the 
misrepresentation.98  Until the market corrects the price following a 
corrective disclosure, the cost of the misrepresentation is reflected in the 
price of the security, and this inflation can still be recovered by reselling the 
security at a price that incorporates the inflation.99  Thus, there is no loss 
causation until inflation dissipates.100
Finally, loss causation can refer to whether the events that actually 
caused the loss are within the class of events that Congress intended the 
securities laws to protect against.
 
101  Courts analogize this concept to the 
tort law doctrine of proximate cause, a policy limitation on liability.102  
Similar to tort, under this articulation of loss causation, the plaintiff’s 
damages must be foreseeable, and they must be caused by a materialization 
of the concealed risk.103  Second Circuit law limits that risk to a “zone of 
risk” concealed by the misstatements.104  In effect, this examines how 
closely the subject of the fraudulent statement relates to the loss, and 
whether that loss was foreseeable.105
Courts qualify the tort analogy.
 
106  While a foreseeable injury in tort is 
one proximately caused by a defendant’s fault, the harm resulting from a 
drop in a company’s share price is not caused by a defendant’s 
misstatement, but rather as a result of market realization of the 
circumstances concealed by the misstatement.107
 
 97. Olazábal, supra note 
 
4, at 339–40 & n.3 (citing Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 
F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 98. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 339–40 & n.3. 
 99. See id.  The owner of the security suffers no loss, since the inflation can be passed 
along to the next unsuspecting purchaser. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 
342 (2005); Olazábal, supra note 4, at 376. 
 100. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 101. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 511 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting 
that proving reliance, as well as either of the corrective disclosure or materialization of the 
risk approaches, is sufficient to establish causation); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 
F.3d 161, 172–75 (2d Cir. 2005); see also AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 
202, 209 (2d Cir. 2000) (articulating the analogy to proximate cause); infra Part III.B 
(discussing corrective disclosure and materialization of the risk theories); infra note 116 
(summarizing circuit law). 
 102. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172–73. 
 103. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 513; infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the 
materialization of the risk theory). 
 104. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 513; Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 
F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001).  Not all circuits recognize this theory. See Schleicher v. 
Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the materialization of a concealed 
risk theory “is not a legal doctrine” and it “adds nothing to the analysis” because the fraud 
lies in the misstatement and the loss is realized when the truth is revealed). 
 105. See McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 222 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 106. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172–73. See generally Fisch, supra note 73 (discussing the 
common law background of causation). 
 107. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172–73. 
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Additionally, the tort metaphor is compromised by its origin in the 
common law.108  Causation in Rule 10b-5 actions has a different meaning 
than it would in tort.109  Securities fraud is a statutory claim, and the 
elements of a statutory claim are those that the legislature intended.110  
Thus, proximate cause determinations are closely tethered to statutory 
intent.111
The disclosure requirements of the securities laws seek to allow investors 
to make accurate judgments about a company’s intrinsic value, rather than 
force companies to speculate about distant or nebulous events.
 
112  
Therefore, a misstatement or omission is the proximate cause of an 
investment loss if the risk that caused the loss was within the “zone of risk” 
that the alleged misrepresentations concealed.113  A loss is foreseeable if 
the misstatement “concealed something from the market that, when 
disclosed, negatively affected the value of the security.”114
Courts in the Second Circuit require plaintiffs to prove reliance, as well 
as either of the two articulations of loss causation, to establish causation.
 
115  
Other circuits apply these or similar tests for pleading and proof of loss 
causation.116
Causation is closely related to damages.  Damages in securities cases are 
calculated based on the impact of disclosure on the market price of a 
security; proof of damages and causation assumes some degree of market 
efficiency.  This Note next explores the economic theory underlying the 
determination of causation and damages in securities cases. 
 
 
 108. See id.; supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 109. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 510. 
 110. See id.; Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 178 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring). 
 111. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 513–14 (granting defendants summary judgment 
where generalized investor concern causing a temporary share price drop did not raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to loss causation). 
 112. See id. at 514. 
 113. See Lentell, 396 F.3d at 172–73. 
 114. See id. at 173. 
 115. See In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 511. 
 116. See Ind. State Dist. Counsel of Laborers & Hod Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v. 
Omnicare, Inc., 583 F.3d 935, 944–47 (6th Cir. 2009) (deciding motion to dismiss); Alaska 
Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 230 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(deciding class certification and holding that the corrective disclosure does not need to 
precisely mirror the misstatement); In re Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 
1130, 1140–42 (10th Cir. 2009) (deciding summary judgment and rejecting plaintiff’s theory 
because it failed to identify the mechanism that revealed the fraud); McCabe v. Ernst & 
Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 426 (3d Cir. 2007) (deciding summary judgment); Tricontinental 
Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 843 (7th Cir. 2007) (deciding 
motion to dismiss and holding that causation must be applied on a statement-by-statement 
basis). 
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C.  Good News, Bad News, and Surprises:  
How Disclosure Affects Market Price 
Though various theories exist as to how to predict stock market 
behavior,117 many economists have adopted the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis (ECMH) as a core working hypothesis.118  The ECMH ties stock 
price to information and expectations.119  The market values a security by 
measuring the present value of the future cash flows generated by the 
corporation’s assets discounted by the company’s cost of capital.120  
According to the theory, the price of publicly-traded securities reflects the 
aggregation of all well-informed investors’ beliefs about the investment’s 
future payouts.121  If a company misstates its past or present financial 
condition, and the market is unaware of the firm’s true financial condition, 
the investing public’s expectations of a company’s future performance are 
inaccurate.122  In turn, the market price of the security adjusts to reflect this 
new information as soon as the market becomes aware of it.123  While 
market participants may value the information differently, the aggregation 
of different valuations establishes the market price, and these divergent 
valuations make trading possible.124
If stock prices track expectations, it follows that even if a company 
announces good news, the market price of a stock will not rise if this news 
is anticipated; on the other hand, if the good news is not as good as 
expected, share price could actually decline.
 
125  Most importantly, when a 
firm announces information that the market expects, or that is already 
known, market price should not change.126  This central tenet of the ECMH 
is the basis for FOTM, the primary theory of reliance in securities class 
actions.127
 
 117. See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the 
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 916 (1989) (observing that economists still debate 
the causes of the 1929 Wall Street crash). 
 
 118. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 60, at 130. 
 119. See id.  Economist Eugene Fama first proposed the theory in a landmark 1970 
article. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:  A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 388 (1970). 
 120. See Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss:  Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation 
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 40 (2005).  Famed economist 
John Maynard Keynes first suggested that this form of market efficiency is untenable. See 
Fischel, supra note 117, at 913.  He analogized traders’ conceptions of asset value to 
predicting the winner of a beauty contest. Id. 
 121. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 60, at 130; see also COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 104–
06 (noting the difficulties inherent in such a sweeping theory). 
 122. See Kaufman, supra note 120, at 40. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 104. 
 125. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 707–08 (3d ed. 1992). 
 126. See id. at 707.  The share price already incorporates that information. See id. 
 127. See Fischel, supra note 117, at 917–22.  FOTM is discussed in Part II of this Note. 
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Perhaps because of its sweeping application, market efficiency has come 
under intense scrutiny.128  Another theory, behavioral finance, posits that 
markets are not necessarily information-efficient.129  According to the 
theory, biased, irrational investors can move the markets.130  These “noise” 
traders transact in securities for motivations related to behavioral biases.131  
As a consequence, noise traders make the markets possible;132 noise 
oscillates the value of a security away from its fundamental value.133  This 
activity creates liquidity in the market and allows informed traders to profit 
based on mispriced securities;134
Theorists take the existence of noise trading as a given, but are uncertain 
about the extent of its effect on the market.
 after all, if everyone agreed on prices, 
trading would cease to exist. 
135  If its effect is substantial, 
noise trading would reduce market efficiency.136  Pervasive behavioral 
biases pose problems for FOTM:  because noisy markets are irrational, the 
scope of liability for improper disclosure would be unpredictable.137  
Damages would be purely speculative, because many consider it impossible 
to ascertain the amount of noise represented in market prices.138
 
 128. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 
  
Proponents of ECMH refute this criticism, however, by arguing that even if 
some market participants make irrational investing decisions, sophisticated 
traders quickly exploit and eliminate unexplored profit opportunities 
60, at 684 (noting that as early as 1992, legal scholars 
familiar with ECMH began to doubt the efficiency of securities markets (quoting Robert M. 
Daines & Jon D. Hanson, The Corporate Law Paradox:  The Case for Restructuring 
Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 577, 614 (1992))); Burch, supra note 15, at 354 (noting the 
“numerous academic challenges” to ECMH); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 139–41 (2006).  The 2008 financial crisis has also 
undermined the ECMH. See Richard A. Posner, On the Receipt of the Ronald H. Coase 
Medal:  Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the Future of Law and Economics, 12 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 265, 278 (2010) (“[E]conomic theory . . . has taken some knocks as a result of 
the economic crisis because it has revived awareness of the importance of uncertainty in 
economic life, as well as undermining ‘efficient markets’ theory . . . .”). See generally JUSTIN 
FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET:  A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION 
ON WALL STREET (2009) (discussing the state of ECMH in the wake of the largest economic 
crisis since the Great Depression). 
 129. See Ribstein, supra note 128, at 137–39 (illustrating some anomalies in the ECMH); 
see also FOX, supra note 128, at 299 (explaining that overconfidence in investing is the most 
consistent characteristic in behavioral finance). 
 130. See Ribstein, supra note 128, at 137–39. 
 131. See id. at 137 (noting noise traders’ cognitive and heuristic errors, such as 
overreaction to news). 
 132. See FOX, supra note 128, at 201–02. 
 133. See id. at 202. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. (arguing that noise trading makes it impossible to ascertain fundamental 
value). 
 136. See Ribstein, supra note 128, at 145; see also FOX, supra note 128, at 204–06 
(discussing anomalies in ECMH). 
 137. See Ribstein, supra note 128, at 137–39. But see Fischel, supra note 117, at 914 
(noting that noise trading “increases volatility but does not create any detectable upward or 
downward bias in pricing”). 
 138. See Fischel, supra note 117, at 914; supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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created by mispriced securities.139  At the very least, since the value of a 
security cannot be isolated from indeterminate noise, the assumption of 
market efficiency is the most accurate indicator of a security’s fundamental 
value.140
D.  The 800-Pound Gorilla:  Class Actions 
  In other words, the ECMH is an elegant but assailable theory, and 
it is the best available.  Class action plaintiffs and their lawyers realized the 
advantages of the ECMH, and soon used it to resolve the procedural hurdles 
of satisfying the unique requirements of class certification. 
Class actions are a mechanism that permits mass aggregation of claims.  
They are big, broad, and expensive.  They are also special.  Class actions 
are an exception to the general rule that a judgment binds only those that are 
parties to the action.141  Plaintiffs that seek to represent a class of similarly-
situated individuals must first satisfy the prerequisites of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 to maintain a class action.142  Securities class action 
plaintiffs typically seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which 
requires putative classes to satisfy two additional requirements.143  A 
“(b)(3)” class must demonstrate that common issues of fact or law 
predominate over individual issues, and that the class action is a superior 
method of adjudication.144  These stringent requirements ensure that class 
representatives adequately represent the interests of absent class 
members.145  A class action judgment binds all members of the class and 
has preclusive effect.146
A court can certify a class only after conducting a rigorous inquiry into 
the Rule 23 prerequisites.
 
147  Certification is a watershed moment that 
substantially increases the settlement value of a lawsuit.148  Prior to the 
Supreme Court’s Basic decision in 1988,149
 
 139. See FOX, supra note 
 defendants attempted to defeat 
128, at 192 (noting that under ECMH, “[i]n a free financial 
market, even a tiny rational minority would invariably prevail”).  If irrational investors are 
willing to buy or sell a security at a price different from its optimal future return, 
sophisticated investors will exploit the opportunity for gain until it no longer exists. See id. 
 140. See Fischel, supra note 117, at 914 (noting that until noise trading is detectable, 
“knowing that prices reflect the expectations of noise traders will not lead to any superior 
method for ascertaining the underlying value of assets.”); id. at 915 (“[I]t takes a theory to 
beat a theory and thus far none exists.”). 
 141. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979). 
 142. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  Rule 23 requires, among other things, that the claims of the class 
share some common question of fact or law, and the class representative must assert claims 
typical of the class as a whole. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. 
Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see, e.g., Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 
2010) (ruling on a class certification motion filed pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 32, 41–42 (reviewing 
the prerequisites to class certification and determining the standard that courts must use to 
determine whether a putative class satisfies each requirement of Rule 23). 
 145. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894–95 (2008). 
 146. See id.; Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 
 147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160–61. 
 148. See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 686.  Certification may put so much pressure on 
defendants that they may be willing to settle cases with unsubstantiated claims. See id. 
 149. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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class certification by arguing that reliance is essentially an individual issue 
that predominates over class-wide issues.150  In Basic, discussed later in 
this Note, the Court blessed the district court’s use of the FOTM theory, an 
application of the ECMH that posits that reliance on the integrity of the 
market price of a security creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance.151  
This reshaping of common law reliance forever altered the legal 
landscape.152  The perceived flood of frivolous litigation following the 
landmark Basic decision prompted congressional action, resulting in the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995153 (PSLRA).  Though loss 
causation ultimately rests on the market’s response to information, the 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that reliance is distinct from loss 
causation.154  Following Halliburton, plaintiffs need not prove loss 
causation to obtain certification because it is a merits issue of class-wide 
proof.155
II.  THE SUPREME COURT CAUSATION TRILOGY:  
BASIC, DURA, AND HALLIBURTON 
  A more detailed review of Halliburton and the Supreme Court’s 
loss causation decisions follows. 
Part II focuses on the three Supreme Court decisions that have directly 
addressed loss causation.  The Supreme Court embraced economic theory in 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, and that decision effectively enabled modern 
securities class actions.156  Because the Court upheld a presumption of 
reliance based on FOTM, it made class actions much easier to maintain.  
Congress responded to perceived abuses by class action plaintiffs with the 
PSLRA, which codified loss causation, but provided very little guidance to 
the courts.  As a result, courts took divergent approaches to loss causation, 
and the Supreme Court’s Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo decision 
resolved only some of those differences.157
 
 150. See Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 681–82; In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 
24, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating a class certification decision on predominance grounds). 
  Causation and damages are 
interlinked, and thus Part II briefly summarizes theories of damages 
following the discussion of Dura.  Part II then concludes with a review of 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., and the consequences of that 
decision. 
 151. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47; see infra Part II.A. 
 152. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 347–48 (noting the frequency of frivolous class action 
lawsuits filed after Basic). 
 153. See infra Part II.B. 
 154. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011); see 
also infra Part II.E (discussing Halliburton). 
 155. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186. 
 156. See 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see also infra Part II.A. 
 157. See 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
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A.  Back to Basic:  Fraud on the Market and the Rebuttable Presumption 
of Reliance 
At common law, plaintiffs had to prove that they reasonably relied on a 
material misstatement that induced the fraudulent transaction.158  This 
element of proof—reliance—establishes a causal link between the 
misconduct and the disputed transaction.159  The courts integrated reliance 
into Rule 10b-5 claims arising from both face-to-face and open-market 
transactions.160  As the class action developed, some courts considered 
severing individual reliance issues, requiring separate trials for each class 
member.161  To avoid these costly endeavors, class action plaintiffs began 
advocating a form of reliance defined by reliance on the integrity of the 
market price, rather than actual reliance on a misstatement or omission.162  
This theory became known as fraud on the market, and it applies the ECMH 
to posit that because “most publicly available information is reflected in 
market price, an investor’s reliance on any public material 
misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 
10b-5 action.”163
Some courts endorsed FOTM and allowed plaintiffs to avoid the 
cumbersome process of individual proof of actual reliance.
 
164  Over time, 
courts eased the reliance requirement, and widespread application of FOTM 
took hold by the early 1980s.165  Given FOTM’s perceived departure from 
the common law, defendants vigorously challenged its application.166  The 
theory reached the Supreme Court in 1988.167
In its seminal holding, the Basic Court did not expressly adopt FOTM in 
Rule 10b-5 actions, but it permitted the lower courts to apply a presumption 
 
 
 158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).  Reliance in FOTM cases is 
also known as transaction causation, and serves as the but for cause of the fraudulent 
transaction. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 341–42; supra Part I.B (distinguishing between different 
articulations of causation). 
 159. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). The facts of the case 
concerned the defendant’s representations about a potential merger. See id. at 227–28. 
 160. See id. at 243–44. 
 161. See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968); 4 HAZEN, supra note 7, 
§ 12.10[5], at 124 (noting the high costs of single-issue trials for each class member). 
 162. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; Fischel, supra note 117, at 908; supra Part I.D 
(discussing class actions). 
 163. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247; see also id. at 241–44; Fischel, supra note 117, at 908–11; 
Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:  Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 151, 153, 158–59 (characterizing Basic as a “profound” but “enigmatic” decision). 
 164. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905–07 (9th Cir. 1975); Fischel, supra 
note 117, at 908. 
 165. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 250 & n.1 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972) (holding that 
actual reliance is unnecessary and that reliance is presumed where an omission is material); 
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 905–06 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 153–54).  By the 
1980s, ECMH had gained traction not only in law and economics, but the hypothesis also 
drove policy making. See Langevoort, supra note 163, at 158. 
 166. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (majority opinion). But see Fischel, supra note 117, at 
908 (noting that FOTM indicates the ultimate proof of objectively reasonable reliance, the 
judgment of a consensus of market makers about the value of a security). 
 167. Basic, 485 U.S. 224. 
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of reliance to plaintiffs asserting FOTM.168  In reaching this “common 
sense” decision, the Court noted the distinctions between face-to-face 
transactions and purchases and sales on the open market.169  In developed 
securities markets, a company’s stock price is determined by all available 
information.170  Individual investors do not engage in face-to-face 
negotiations with the culpable parties, but the information is still 
transmitted to the investor in the form of the stock price.171  Misleading 
statements defraud investors because investors rely on the market price of a 
security as an indicator of its true value.172  Under FOTM, reliance on the 
integrity of the market price establishes the requisite causal connection 
between the fraud and the purchase or sale of stock.173  Essentially, the 
market acts “as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given 
all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market 
price.”174  It follows that plaintiffs can be defrauded even if they are 
completely unaware of the misstatement.175
The presumption of reliance established by FOTM typically has three 
elements.
 
176  First, the misstatement must be material; second, the security 
must trade in an efficient market; and third, the misstatement must have 
been publicly disseminated.177
 
 168. See id. at 241–42, 250 (“It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance 
supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.”). 
  The link between the misrepresentation and 
the purchase price is not invariably strong, however, and defendants can 
rebut the presumption with “[a]ny showing that severs the link” between the 
 169. See id. at 242–44, 244 n.22, 246. 
 170. See id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986)); 
supra Part I.C. 
 171. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–44 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61).  In holding that 
investors rely on the integrity of the market price, the Court, perhaps echoing Theodore 
Roosevelt, asked, “Who would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap[s] game?” Id. at 
245–47, 247 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys. Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982)); see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–44 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61).  To put it 
another way, the share price is an aggregation of the different evaluations of a stock’s value 
by different market participants. See id. at 244.  The investor acts in reliance on the 
misstatement because the investor trusts that the stock is worth the market price. See id. at 
244–45. 
 173. See id. at 241–42 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61).  This, of course, does not 
establish the causal connection between the misstatement and the loss. See supra Part I.B. 
 174. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. 
Tex. 1980)). 
 175. See Fischel, supra note 117, at 908. 
 176. See 4 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.10[6][A], at 130. 
 177. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27; In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 
474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008).  Courts often cite the test set forth in Cammer v. Bloom to determine 
whether shares trade in an efficient market. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989); see, e.g., In re 
DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 n.14 (3d Cir. 2011).  The “Cammer factors” include 
the average weekly trading volume, the number of securities analysts reporting on the 
security, the extent to which market makers traded the security, the issuer’s eligibility to file 
an SEC registration Form S-3 (a registration form for seasoned reporting companies), and 
the cause-and-effect relationship between material disclosures and changes in the security’s 
price. Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87. 
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misrepresentation and the price paid by the plaintiff.178  Defendants can 
rebut the presumption if the securities traded in an inefficient market.179  
However, the presumption is extremely difficult to rebut for issuers whose 
securities are traded on national exchanges.180
The Basic decision left some open questions.  Among them, the Court 
did not adopt any rule establishing how quickly publicly-available 
information must be reflected in the market price.
 
181  Justice White’s 
opinion criticized the plurality for applying an economic rationale at the 
cost of legal analysis, as well as for creating a presumption that is “virtually 
impossible” to rebut.182  Despite these concerns, the Basic decision 
revolutionized securities fraud.183
B.  Legislative Reform:  The PSLRA Codifies Causation 
  Not only did Basic’s tacit endorsement 
of FOTM permit the circuit courts to develop their own FOTM rules, it 
made aggregation of claims in the form of class actions much easier. 
Following the Basic decision, and in response to growing concerns over 
the expanding use of the class action device, Congress enacted the 
PSLRA.184  The PSLRA represented the first substantial congressional 
reforms to the securities laws since the ‘33 and ‘34 Acts.185
 
 178. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248. 
  Congress 
 179. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that because initial public offerings are sold in an undeveloped market, it is 
therefore not efficient, and thus FOTM is not available); 4 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.10, at 
135 (“It is axiomatic that the fraud-on-the-market presumption depends on the existence of 
an active market.”).  See generally Matt Silverman, Note, Fraud Created the Market:  
Presuming Reliance in Rule 10b-5 Primary Securities Market Fraud Litigation, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1787 (2011), for an analysis of FOTM’s companion doctrine in primary 
markets. 
 180. See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980); cf. Basic, 485 
U.S. at 252, 255–56, 256 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906–07 & n.22 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
 181. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.28 (majority opinion).  The Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to address this issue in Apollo Group, Inc. v. Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit 
Fund, but denied certiorari. See 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011).  This Note discusses Apollo in Part 
III.E. 
 182. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 252, 255–56, 256 n.7 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 183. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (majority opinion); Fischel, supra note 117, at 907 
(noting that FOTM “revolutionized” securities fraud); see also Barbara Black, Fraud on the 
Market:  A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market 
Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 441 (1984) (a pre-Basic article indicating that individual 
reliance prohibited the use of the class action mechanism in Rule 10b-5 cases); Fisch, supra 
note 73, at 818–19; infra Part II.B (discussing Congress’s response to the proliferation of 
class actions following Basic). 
 184. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.); see John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform:  The Long and Winding 
Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 347–61 
(1996); Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995:  Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, 
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1013–15, 1018 (1996) (noting that prior to the 
PSLRA, “there were no compelling reasons not to initiate speculative class action lawsuits”). 
 185. Phillips & Miller, supra note 184, at 1009. 
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hoped the PSLRA would combat abusive techniques used by plaintiffs and 
their lawyers, including initiating “strike” suits,186 coercing settlements 
with the threat of expensive discovery, and manipulation of class action 
plaintiffs by their attorneys.187  Congress sought to eliminate suits filed by 
the plaintiffs’ bar immediately after any significant drop in a company’s 
stock price, regardless of whether evidence of fraud existed.188  Among 
other reforms, the PSLRA placed restrictions on class representatives, 
attorney’s fees, and the scope of discovery.189  Importantly, the PSLRA 
requires that plaintiffs specify each misleading statement for which they 
seek relief,190 and it established a damages cap.191  To avoid providing 
successful plaintiffs with a windfall caused by market overreaction to bad 
news, the PSLRA caps damages to the difference between the sale price of 
the security and its mean trading price over the ninety days following the 
disclosure of the fraud.192
In response to concerns that some courts adopted a presumption of loss 
causation,
 
193 Congress codified the causation element as part of the 
PSLRA.194  Since the PSLRA, courts have used loss causation as a 
gatekeeping mechanism that restricts the flow of frivolous securities class 
actions.195  While Congress codified causation, the PSLRA did not indicate 
how parties could prove it.196
 
 186. A strike suit is an action “without reasonable grounds to believe it has merit.” Elliott 
J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:  How Institutional 
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2085 
(1995).  A strike suit has a negative net present value, since the plaintiff cannot prevail on 
the merits. Id. at 2086. 
  In the absence of legislative guidance, courts 
took charge of the matter. 
 187. 4 HAZEN, supra note 7, § 12.15[1], at 251 & n.10. See generally James D. Cox, 
Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497 (1997) (weighing 
criticisms of the class action device post-PSLRA); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform:  
Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533 (1997) (assessing the PSLRA 
reforms). 
 188. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687; 
Olazábal, supra note 4, at 347. 
 189. See generally 4 Hazen, supra note 7, § 12.15[1] (summarizing the reforms 
implemented by the PSLRA). 
 190. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 
(2005). 
 191. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1). 
 192. See id.; Burch, supra note 15, at 355–57. 
 193. See Avery, supra note 184, at 362 n.189 (citing Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory 
Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 883, 913–17 (1990)). 
 194. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, the 
plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the defendant alleged to 
violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”); 
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 13 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 (noting that the 
plaintiffs bear the burden of proof of causation but defendant could prove that “factors 
unrelated to the fraud contributed to the loss”). 
 195. See Fisch, supra note 73, at 816, 825. 
 196. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 348. 
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C.  A Tangle of Causation:  The Dura Decision 
  To resolve a split among circuits over pleading loss causation, the 
Supreme Court decided Dura.197  The crux of the allegations concerned 
alleged misrepresentations by the defendant Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
regarding profits from drug sales, as well as the likelihood of Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approval of an asthmatic spray device.198  
Dura’s share price lost almost half its value when Dura announced lower 
than expected earnings.199  The share price declined further when Dura later 
announced that the FDA would not approve its asthmatic spray device.200  
Despite these declines, the stock price recovered within a week of the final 
corrective disclosure.201
In the wake of the PSLRA’s codification of loss causation,
 
202 courts 
applied divergent pleading standards for loss causation.203  Some courts, 
including the Ninth Circuit, endorsed the “purchase price inflation” 
theory.204  Purchase price inflation posits that plaintiffs suffer their loss 
when they purchase securities inflated by misrepresentation, rather than 
when the concealed fraud materializes and the stock suffers a coordinate 
price drop.205
The Supreme Court rejected this theory of causation and loss.
 
206  
Beginning with an analysis of proof of causation in common law fraud 
actions, the Court cited authority focusing on traditional reliance actions, 
rather than FOTM cases.207  The Court suggested that while an artificially 
inflated share price is necessary to plead loss causation, it is not sufficient—
an inflated purchase price might, but it does not always, cause economic 
loss.208  According to the Court, a purchaser of an artificially inflated 
security has suffered no loss at the moment of purchase; the shareholder 
could simply resell the security at the purchase price on the market, or even 
profit from a sale of the security before the fraud is revealed.209
 
 197. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
  It is only 
after the truth of the fraud reaches the market that an investor has suffered 
 198. See id. at 339. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See supra Part II.B. 
 203. See Thomas F. Gillespie, III, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo:  A Missed 
Opportunity to Right the Wrongs in the PSLRA and Rebalance the Private Rule 10b-5 
Litigation Playing Field, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 161, 167–68 (2008). 
 204. See, e.g., Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 
U.S. 336. 
 205. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 338. 
 206. See id. at 342 (“[A]s a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction takes 
place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase payment is offset by ownership 
of a share that at that instant possesses equivalent value.”). 
 207. See Fox, supra note 20, at 865 (“[T]he common law cases on causation provide very 
little meaningful guidance to the question before the Court.”). 
 208. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
 209. See id. at 342–43 (“[I]f, say, the purchaser sells the shares quickly before the 
relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will not have led to any loss.”). 
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any loss.210  Under the ECMH, as soon as the market is aware of the fraud, 
inflation dissipates, depressing the market price to the value of the security 
absent the fraud—in other words, the stock reaches its true value.211  Thus, 
under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, a purchaser who bought artificially 
inflated shares could sell the shares prior to the disclosure of the truth, yet 
still recover damages in subsequent litigation.212  The purchase price 
inflation theory failed because it does not sufficiently allege either causation 
or loss.213  To buttress its holding, the Court emphatically noted that Rule 
10b-5 suits exist “not to provide investors with broad insurance against 
market losses, but to protect them against those economic losses that 
misrepresentations actually cause.”214
To reach this decision, the Dura Court noted that it must be the 
misrepresentation that causes the loss, rather than some other of the “tangle 
of factors” affecting share price.
 
215  Changing market conditions, industry 
downturns, or company-specific factors unrelated to fraud could cause a 
drop in share price.216  While Dura expressly requires plaintiffs to prove 
the effect of the misstatements on the value of the security as a whole, the 
decision did not guide the lower courts on issues of proof.217  This led to the 
current loss causation climate involving hotly-litigated evidentiary 
issues.218
D.  No Harm, No Foul:  A Brief Note on Dura and Types of Damages 
  Before considering the byzantine methods of proof of loss 
causation, it is important to understand the types of damages that informed 
the Dura decision. 
Given the relative few securities class actions to proceed to the liability 
stage,219 authority on damages is both inconsistent and problematic.220
 
 210. See id. 
  At 
 211. See Fox, supra note 20, at 864 (criticizing the Court’s language concerning that 
revelation of the truth to the market following an initially inflated share price “might mean a 
later loss”).  If the share price was initially inflated due to a misstatement, a revelation of the 
truth of the fraud must cause a loss under the ECMH. See id. (noting that this conclusion of 
the Dura Court was “wrong”). 
 212. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.  The Dura Court explicitly refused to consider a scenario 
where an “in and out” trader sells shares for more than the inflated purchase price, but before 
the market price of the security deflates following the revelation of the truth. See id. at 343.  
“In and out” traders are investors who have sold their shares prior to the corrective 
disclosure. See David S. Escoffery, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 
10b-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1792 & n.103 (2000). 
 213. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 346 (noting that Congress had clear intent “to permit private 
securities fraud actions for recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately allege and 
prove the traditional elements of causation and loss. . . .  [T]he Ninth Circuit’s approach 
would allow recovery where a misrepresentation leads to an inflated purchase price but 
nonetheless does not proximately cause any economic loss.”). 
 214. Id. at 345. 
 215. See id. at 343. 
 216. See id. at 342–43. 
 217. See Olazábal, supra note 4, at 341 (noting that the Court disposed of the case “in a 
characteristically minimalist way, declining to articulate a clear loss causation standard”). 
 218. Id. at 339. 
 219. See supra note 25. 
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common law, courts often awarded rescissory damages for face-to-face 
transactions,221 but modern courts soon realized that contract remedies were 
inappropriate for litigation arising from open-market transactions.222  Most 
courts adopted an out-of-pocket remedy.223  Out-of-pocket losses equal the 
difference between the price paid or received for the security, and the actual 
value of the security if it were not artificially inflated by fraud.224  Under 
this theory of damages, an investor with a positive net recovery on the 
transaction is not entitled to any later recovery.225  Thus, if a security 
appreciates following the revelation of a misrepresented fact, a purchaser 
could not recover even though the investment is worth less than it would 
have been absent the fraud.226
Dura requires plaintiffs to tie their losses to the defendant’s 
misrepresentation.
 
227  Loss causation should therefore subject defendants 
only to actual, compensable injuries,228 thus serving the deterrent function 
of private remedies.229  Since unpredictable damages undermine deterrence, 
out-of-pocket recovery bolsters a class action’s ability to deter fraud.230  
Furthermore, some commentators note that the out-of-pocket rule is the 
only measure of damages consistent with the common law, the loss 
causation requirement, and the PSLRA.231
 
 220. See Burch, supra note 
 
15, at 349, 353, 355 (calling for an out-of-pocket measure of 
damages and noting that “no coherent doctrinal statement exists for calculating open-market 
damages in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class actions”); see also 4 HAZEN, supra note 7, 
§ 12.12[1][A], at 179 (noting that the current state of the law is “difficult” because most 
litigation does not proceed to a final judgment).  The PSLRA’s framers also found this issue 
difficult. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 19 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 698 
(“The current method of calculating damages in 1934 Act securities fraud cases is complex, 
with no statutory guidance to provide certainty.”). 
 221. See Burch, supra note 15, at 363.  In face-to-face transactions, courts sometimes 
applied the “benefit-of-the-bargain” rule based in contract law, where the aggrieved party 
could recover expectation damages, defined as the amount the plaintiffs would have 
received, including profits, if the defendant had performed. See id. at 365. 
 222. See id. at 362–64. 
 223. See id. at 359, 362–64. 
 224. See id. at 364 & nn.78–79.  This measure assumes that the investor held the security 
through the final corrective disclosure of the class period. See id. 
 225. See id. at 364–65. 
 226. See id.  However, in dicta, Dura did not proscribe recovery under this hypothetical 
set of facts. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005); Burch, supra note 
15, at 360 (noting the problem of corporations bundling good and bad news to prevent share 
price decline); Fox, supra note 20, at 846–57 (describing hypothetical damages scenarios 
that Dura did not address).  This issue is still unsettled. See Fox, supra note 20, at 847. 
 227. See Burch, supra note 15, at 386; supra Part II.C (discussing the Dura holding). 
 228. See id. at 386. 
 229. See id. at 394. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. at 396; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006) (limiting damages to actual 
damages caused by the fraud).  As one of the PSLRA’s reforms, damages were limited to the 
difference between the sale price of the security and the mean trading price in the ninety 
days following the disclosure correcting the misstatement. See Burch, supra note 15, at 356–
57.  This is known as the “bounce-back” provision. See Robert A. Fumerton, Market 
Overreaction and Loss Causation, 62 BUS. LAW. 89, 90 (2006).  One commentator notes that 
market overreaction can occur not only after the final corrective disclosure of a class period, 
but to all corrective disclosures made across a class period. See id. at 92. 
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Even if out-of-pocket damages are the standard rule in most securities 
class actions, there is no uniform model for proving those losses.232  
Damages assessments require expert testimony opining on what a security 
would have been worth had it not been tainted by fraud.233  Expert inflation 
models project per-share damages across the length of the class period.234  
Perhaps because of the difficulties in ascertaining out-of-pocket loss, courts 
often hold that while damages cannot be speculative, they “need not be 
calculated with mathematical precision.”235  This Note argues that damages 
should be calculated with greater precision given their inextricability from 
causation.236
E.  A Merits Issue:  Halliburton’s Impact on Proof of Loss Causation 
 
The Supreme Court decided Halliburton in June 2011.237  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendant Halliburton Co. made misstatements concerning 
its expected liability in asbestos litigation, its anticipated revenues, and the 
potential benefits of a merger.238  The decision reversed a line of cases from 
the Fifth Circuit that required plaintiffs to prove loss causation to obtain the 
presumption of reliance, and therefore class certification.239
The Fifth Circuit’s cases illustrate the intersection of reliance and loss 
causation.  In Halliburton, the district court declined to certify a class 
because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate loss causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
 
240  For class certification purposes, 
plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit could show either an increase in the stock price 
after the release of false news, or demonstrate a decrease in price following 
a corrective disclosure.241  The plaintiffs did not argue that any of the 
misstatements caused inflation, and the lower court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claims that the purported corrective disclosures tied to any fraud, thus 
defeating the requisite causal connection.242  The Fifth Circuit affirmed.243
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s apparent conflation of 




 232. See Burch, supra note 
  The Court carefully distinguished loss 
15, at 390. 
 233. See id. at 389–90. 
 234. See infra Part III.B. 
 235. Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 928, 934 
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing Hoefferle Truck Sales, Inc. v. Divco-Wayne Corp., 523 F.2d 543, 
553 (7th Cir. 1975)); see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 
562 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 236. See infra Part IV. 
 237. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 238. Id. at 2183. 
 239. See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th 
Cir. 2007), abrogated by Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179. 
 240. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2183–84. 
 241. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 3:02-CV-
1152-M, 2008 WL 4791492, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008), aff’d, 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 
2010), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 
S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 242. See id. at *4, *5–20. 
 243. 597 F.3d 330. 
 244. See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185–87. 
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causation from reliance, noting that reliance is a distinct element of proof 
that is “focused on facts surrounding the investor’s decision to engage in 
the transaction.”245  Loss causation is conceptually distinct because it 
“requires a plaintiff to show that a misrepresentation that affected the 
integrity of the market price also caused a subsequent economic loss,” 
rather than just a distortion at the time of the transaction.246
On appeal, Halliburton argued that some of the alleged misstatements did 
not result in a change in the market price of the defendant’s securities.
 
247  In 
other words, the market did not react to Halliburton’s false statements.248  
A lack of price impact of an alleged misstatement can be attributed to 
several factors:  that the statement is immaterial, or that the securities are 
traded in an inefficient market.249  Where there is no price impact, it 
follows that there is no loss causation.250  Halliburton argued that this lack 
of price impact defeated reliance as well.251  Halliburton based this on the 
rationale that if the market price of a security reflects all public information, 
and that reliance is based on the integrity of the market, there can be no 
reliance on statements that do not impact the market price of securities.252  
The Supreme Court did not address this argument because the Fifth Circuit 
clearly held that putative classes must prove loss causation—not reliance—
to obtain certification.253
For purposes of this Note, the Supreme Court’s decision was most 
notable because it roundly affirmed loss causation’s role as a merits issue 
that, when disputed, must be decided at trial.
 
254
III.  THE EVIDENCE:  HOW DO YOU PROVE LOSS CAUSATION AT TRIAL? 
  In Part III, this Note 
considers the evidence that parties use to prove loss causation.  These 
methods are based on the application of the ECMH to statistical regression 
analyses.  Juries have misapplied these models in several recent trials. 
Part III considers the evidentiary aspects of loss causation.  Expert 
witnesses must carefully parse the disclosures that substantiate plaintiffs’ 
 
 245. Id. at 2186. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at 2187. 
 248. See id. 
 249. See In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481–83 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007), 
abrogated by Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179. 
 250. See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2186. 
 251. See id. at 2186–87. 
 252. See id.; Brief for Amicus Curiae Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association in Support of Respondents at 8–9, Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 09-
1403), 2011 WL 1253910, at *8–9.  The parties did not dispute that Halliburton’s securities 
traded in an efficient market, so, according to FOTM, all public information was 
incorporated into the market price. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179. 
 253. See Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. at 2187 (noting that although the Fifth Circuit’s opinion 
“may include some language consistent with a ‘price impact’ approach . . . we simply cannot 
ignore the Court of Appeals’ repeated and explicit references to ‘loss causation’”). 
 254. See id. at 2183. 
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claims of price distortion and dissipation.  This part first reviews the basic 
statistical principles underlying event studies.  These event studies isolate 
the impact of disclosure on the market price of securities, yielding measures 
of damages.  Experts sometimes extrapolate these models backwards to 
calculate damages on each day of class periods.  Part III then considers 
some common theories of causation that identify the mechanisms for 
disclosure of the concealed fraud.  These models are complicated when 
experts link specific misstatements to inflation; many cases concern 
hundreds of alleged misstatements.  Litigants in several recent trials used 
comparable causation models, and the juries’ application of those models 
ran afoul of Dura.  This part concludes with an exploration of those trials. 
A.  The Event Study:  Making Sense of the “Tangle of Factors” 
Dura was a narrow decision that rejected the purchase price inflation 
theory of pleading,255 but courts apply the decision at later procedural 
stages.256  Many courts require experts to conduct event studies, which 
isolate the effect of company-specific news from market-wide factors.257  In 
the context of securities litigation, an event study is traditionally defined as 
a statistical regression analysis that determines the effect of an event on the 
market price of a security.258  An event study answers one critical question:  
what would the market price of a stock be but for the fraud that distorted its 
value?259  The reliability of the event study, which interlinks materiality, 
reliance, loss causation, and damages, is perhaps the overriding evidentiary 
issue in securities fraud actions.260  The event study is predicated on 
efficient capital markets, because a security’s market price incorporates all 
public information.261  Given its essential role in these cases, the event 
study cannot be based on “junk science.”262
 
 255. See Fox, supra note 
 
20, at 846 (noting that the decision was “extremely narrow” and 
that Dura simply rejected the theory that an investor suffers a loss at the time of purchase); 
see also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 261, 265 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (noting that Dura did not define an appropriate pleading standard; rather, it simply 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s “overly permissive” standard). 
 256. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (citing circuit decisions applying Dura). 
 257. See, e.g., In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 
1585605, at *21 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011). 
 258. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing:  The Troubling 
Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
183, 186–87 (2009). 
 259. See Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards in Calculating Damages for 
Shareholder Class Action Litigation, 62 BUS. LAW. 955, 957 (2007). 
 260. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 187 (suggesting that event studies 
have become an independent, essential element of a securities fraud claim). 
 261. See id. at 190. 
 262. See id.  Of course, expert testimony must satisfy the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
the Supreme Court’s test for admissibility of expert testimony set forth in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  Before a court admits expert testimony, it 
must consider, among other things, whether the techniques used by the expert have been 
tested, have been subject to peer review, whether the technique has a potential rate of error, 
and whether the scientific community has generally accepted the technique. See Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 592–95; see also Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 189–90. 
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To prepare an event study, experts must first identify the instances that 
led the market to change its expectations about the value of a company’s 
stock.263  These “events” include the fraudulent statements themselves, and 
the disclosure that first reveals the truth of the fraud to the market.264  These 
misstatements inflate the share price, but inflation dissipates once the 
market becomes aware of the truth of the concealed fraud.265
Experts next select the “event window,” the interval over which the 
expert calculates stock price movements.
 
266  Stock prices may not respond 
to an event instantaneously, because sometimes the market gradually comes 
to terms with the new information; experts often limit the window to the 
day of the event,267 but windows sometimes extend over longer 
intervals.268  While longer windows may incorporate the full market 
response to the event, they may also incorporate unrelated factors.269  
Importantly, where multiple events occur rapidly, longer windows may 
distort the analysis.270  Therefore, to achieve an optimal estimate of 
inflation, experts should restrict the event window if multiple disclosures 
occur over a short period.271
To ascertain the true value of the stock, the expert must isolate the effect 
of the fraud on the share price from other unrelated factors that affect a 
security’s market value.
 
272  These factors include market-wide, industry-
wide, and company-specific factors unrelated to fraud.273  Unrelated events 
in the “tangle” of factors affecting share price are known as confounding 
events.274
 
 263. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 
  To isolate the effect of the event, the expert examines the 
258, at 191.  Often, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
select these events. See id. at 191 n.27. 
 264. See id. at 191; Allen, supra note 259, at 958 (noting that selection of events is 
perhaps the most important component of an event study).  The “announcement date” must 
be identifiable; the market cannot have anticipated it. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra 
note 258, at 191–92.  These announcements can take several forms. See infra Part III.C 
(discussing corrective disclosures, leakage, and materialization of the risk theories). 
 265. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191; infra note 302. 
 266. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191–92. 
 267. See id. 
 268. See Allen, supra note 259, at 958 (noting that where information is gradually leaked, 
the market may take more time to respond, justifying a longer window); see also Kaufman & 
Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191 & n.30.  Though the markets typically take a day to 
respond, experts often use a three-day event window to account for the difficulties associated 
with gradual leakage of the information to the public. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra 
note 258, at 192; Allen, supra note 259, at 958. 
 269. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 191. 
 270. See Allen, supra note 259, at 959. 
 271. See id. (“Intuitively, one cannot disentangle the abnormal return associated with a 
single event when there are several announcements within the same event window.  That is, 
the stock price does not have sufficient time between announcements to return to ‘normal’ so 
as to form a baseline for the subsequent event.”). 
 272. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 192–93, 198. 
 273. See id. at 192–93. 
 274. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005); Kaufman & 
Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 231; see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634 
F. Supp. 2d 352, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 
1447 (11th Cir. 1997)) (noting that distinguishing share price declines caused by extraneous 
factors from those caused by a corrective disclosure is generally the province of an expert). 
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relationship of the stock price movement of the company to the movement 
of a market or industry index over a specified length of time.275  Experts 
select an appropriate market model, such as the capital asset pricing model, 
to determine the security’s sensitivity to overall market-wide moves over 
non-event periods.276  This determines the stock’s volatility—its sensitivity 
to general market conditions.277  Expert then apply the model over the event 
window to determine the “normal” return that would have prevailed absent 
the event.278  This isolates the effect of the event from other market-wide 
and industry-wide changes.279
If there is any remaining price movement, it is considered “abnormal”; 
abnormal return is the difference between the actual return controlled for 
market and industry movement, and the normal return.
 
280  If the abnormal 
return is high enough, it is likely statistically significant.281  In effect, the 
analysis measures the amount of inflation or deflation in a security’s market 
price on any given day.282
Courts exclude flawed event studies, including those that fail to 
disaggregate company-specific, non-fraud related news.
 
283  This scenario 
often occurs where multiple disclosures of bad news are made on the same 
day.  Confounding events are only some of the difficulties that enter an 
expert’s analysis of the causal effect of “truth” entering the market.284  To 
prepare the event study, an expert must identify events by considering the 
mechanisms that reveal the concealed risks to the market.285
 
 275. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 
  Though 
experts do not prepare event studies for every day of class periods, event 
studies form the basis for damages assessments, which measure the per-
share dollar value of inflation.  The next section of this Note summarizes 
some common methodologies for calculating inflation and damages. 
258, at 193.  This is called “running a 
regression”; the period of time is often similar in length to the event window. See id. 
 276. See Allen, supra note 259, at 957–58; see also Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. 
Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 
11, 16–18 (2009). 
 277. See Allen, supra note 259, at 957. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 192–93. 
 280. See Allen, supra note 259, at 957. 
 281. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 192–93.  Abnormal returns must be 
statistically significant to account for chance price movement. Id. 
 282. See Allen, supra note 259, at 956; Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 186–
99. 
 283. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 208–10 & nn.154 & 157 (noting that 
a faulty event study can prevent class certification and that a proper event study considers 
materiality and market efficiency, in addition to loss causation and damages); see also infra 
note 337 and accompanying text. 
 284. Kaufman and Wunderlich argue that requiring an event study is unconstitutional and 
inconsistent with the securities laws; since determining the credibility of experts is a 
quintessential issue of fact, the judge “usurps” the jury’s role by removing competing expert 
testimony from jury consideration. See generally Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 
220–60. 
 285. See infra Part III.C. 
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B.  Where the Money Is:  Damages & Inflation Methodologies 
Experts often opine on per-share damages to the class.286  Damages 
analyses in securities fraud claims typically begin with the event study 
detailing the “true” price of a security—that is, measuring the value of the 
security absent the alleged fraud.287  The event study measures inflation and 
dissipation on statistically significant abnormal returns.288  Based on the 
abnormal returns, an expert determines artificial inflation, then “back-casts” 
the inflation using one of three common approaches to establish a value line 
measuring damages over each day of the class period.289  These approaches 
are known as the index method, the constant percentage method, and the 
constant dollar method, and they purport to identify the true value of the 
share on any given day in the class period, at least for purposes of 
measuring damages.290
According to the index method, the company’s share price rises and falls 
in proportion to an established market index.
 
291  If, for example, the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average fell 10 percent over the course of the class period, 
the “true” price of the company’s shares would have fallen at that same 
rate.292
The constant percentage method assumes that inflation does not vary 
unless the company makes additional misstatements.
 
293  An expert “back-
casts” from the final market price, and sets the amount of inflation as an 
unchanging percentage of the share price after the final corrective 
disclosure.294
 
 286. See Tabak, supra note 
 
22, at 1. 
 287. See id. at 1; supra Part III.A.  These methodologies are most useful for settlement 
purposes; juries in recent trials have made findings of fact of share price inflation on a daily 
basis. See In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV-3400, 2010 WL 
4537550, at *20 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010); infra Part III.E. 
 288. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 289. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1. 
 290. See id.; Jeff G. Hammel & B. John Casey, Sizing Securities Fraud Damages:  
‘Constant Percentage’ on Way Out?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 21, 2009, at 4; see also William O. 
Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 
EMORY L.J. 843, 877 & n.97 (2005).  Each of these models assumes that after the final 
corrective disclosure of the event study, the actual price and true price are equivalent; that is, 
inflation in the share price goes to zero. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1–2. 
 291. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 1–2; see also Hammel & Casey, supra note 290.  
 292. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 2 (conducting similar calculations based on the S&P 
500 index).  Thus, if the index fell 10 percent over the class period, and if a share is worth 
$20 following the misstatement, $12 on the day before the truth hits the market, and the 
value of the stock is $9 following the corrective disclosure, the “true” price at the start of the 
class period would be $10. See id.  Therefore, damages would equal the original market 
price, $20, minus $10. Id.  This example is grossly oversimplified, since it accounts for a 
class period with only one misrepresentation, a paradigmatic corrective disclosure, and no 
confounding events. See id.; supra Part III.A. 
 293. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 2. 
 294. See id.  If the actual stock price is $9 at the end of the class period, it fell 25 percent 
from the pre-corrective price of $12. See id.  This percentage is constant throughout the 
entire post-misrepresentation period, so under the constant percentage method, damages 
equal 25 percent of the $20 initial share price, or $5, for class members who purchased on 
the day of the misrepresentation. See id. 
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Under the constant dollar method, the price drop at the end of the class 
period represents the uniform amount of dollar inflation following the most 
recent misstatement.295  Under this method, the dollar value of inflation 
remains constant over the period between misstatements and corrective 
disclosures.296
These three methods yield three different results, and when spread over 
multiple misstatements in longer class periods, experts’ analyses can 
possibly overstate or understate damages depending solely on the choice of 
methodology.
 
297  One commentator notes that, post-Dura, only the constant 
dollar method is legally tenable.298  Perhaps because these methods of 
calculating damages do not produce uniform results, courts in recent trials 
required the juries to determine damages for each day of lengthy class 
periods.299
C.  Coming Clean:  Disclosure Mechanisms 
  Identifying the mechanism that reveals the truth of the fraud to 
the market complicates damages further. 
An event study determines the amount of inflation and deflation in the 
period surrounding a misstatement, as well as when its truth is revealed to 
the public.300  Statistical events do not easily correlate to real-world events; 
the truth of a concealed fraud may enter the market through various 
mechanisms.301  While the means of dissipation are not necessarily 
foreseeable, dissipation itself is an inevitable consequence.302  In other 
words, the market will always learn the truth.303  After Dura, disclosure 
mechanisms triggering dissipation warranted intense judicial scrutiny.304
1.  The Corrective Disclosure 
 
Dura’s requirement that a stock price show decline after the truth of the 
fraud hits the market is heavily litigated.305
 
 295. See id. at 3. 
  Plaintiffs often satisfy this 
 296. See id.  In this hypothetical, the difference between the actual price prior to the 
corrective disclosure and the price after is $3. 
 297. See id. at 3; Hammel & Casey, supra note 290, at 7 (suggesting that the constant 
percentage method does not satisfy Dura, since it potentially allows purchasers to recover 
for share price declines caused by factors other than fraud).  The In re Williams Sec. Litig.-
WCG Subclass district court rejected the constant percentage model. 558 F.3d 1130, 1134 
n.2 (10th Cir. 2009); see also In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV-
3400, 2010 WL 4537550, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010) (“More aggressive methods of 
calculation could result in damages ranging from approximately $25 million to 
approximately $120 million.”). 
 298. See Tabak, supra note 22, at 13. 
 299. See infra Part III.E. 
 300. See supra Part III.A. 
 301. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 101. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See id. 
 304. See id. at 119 (advocating a broad standard for loss causation and noting that courts 
have identified various definitions of “truth” on the market and adopted per se rules 
excluding any losses incurred before the truth is revealed). 
 305. See id.; Pietrzak & McLaughlin, supra note 23. 
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requirement by alleging a “corrective disclosure,” a public statement that 
reveals some previously concealed fact.306  The classic corrective 
disclosure occurs when defendants make a material misstatement, conceal 
it, and then publicly reveal the full scope of their fraud.307  Corporate press 
releases, market analyst reports,308 ratings downgrades, and newspaper 
publications can serve this role,309 though Dura did not specify a standard 
for identifying corrective disclosures.310  A corrective disclosure is often 
identified by a dramatic drop in stock price immediately following a 
disclosure,311 because all share price inflation dissipates once the market 
learns the whole truth.312  The Tenth Circuit’s decision in In re Williams 
Securities Litigation-WCG Subclass illustrates the court’s reluctance to 
allow claims to survive summary judgment where an expert fails to select 
events properly.313  In that decision, the court expressed skepticism that the 
plaintiffs could prepare a complaint on the very day of the first corrective 
disclosure if the public was not already aware of those facts.314
The next section considers when the truth of previously concealed frauds 
does not enter the market through a paradigmatic corrective disclosure.  
Rather, the market sometimes absorbs information in pieces, if frauds are 
slowly or partially revealed. 
   
2.  Indirect or Partial Disclosure:  Materialization of the Risk 
and “Leakage” 
The lack of a specific corrective disclosure is not fatal to proof of loss 
causation.315
 
 306. See Thorsen, supra note 
  Plaintiffs often argue that a risk materialized through 
70, at 101. 
 307. See id. 
 308. See In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV-04-2147, 2008 WL 3072731, at *3–4 
(D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2008) (holding that a re-characterization of previously disclosed facts 
could sometimes be corrective), rev’d and remanded, No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th 
Cir. June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011). But see In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 511–13 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a recharacterization of 
previously disclosed facts is not a corrective disclosure). 
 309. Courts differ in their characterizations of what types of disclosures constitute a 
corrective disclosure. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 352, 363 
n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the paradigmatic corrective disclosure comes from the 
issuer itself).  Corrective disclosures are sometimes placed in a separate conceptual category 
from “materialization of the risk.” See id. at 363 n.9, 366; see also In re Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. Sec. Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 148, 164–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that corrective 
disclosures include all possible loss-inducing events).  Other courts apparently disregard this 
distinction. See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
materialization of the risk “is not a legal doctrine or anything special as a matter of fact”). 
 310. See Fox, supra note 20, at 865–66. 
 311. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 101. 
 312. See id. 
 313. 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).  The case concerned the stock price of the issuer, 
WCG.  The market price had declined steadily, but coincided with the industry-wide market 
for telecommunications stocks. See id. at 1132–34. 
 314. Id. at 1141.  Consistent with ECMH, courts have rejected particular disclosures that 
did not really include new information. See supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
 315. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 102–03. 
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staggered or partial disclosures;316 when “the alleged misstatement conceals 
a condition or event which then occurs and causes the plaintiff’s loss, it is 
the materialization of the undisclosed condition or event that causes the 
loss.”317  This risk could materialize through adverse events other than—or 
in addition to—corrective disclosures, including partial revelations of 
wrongdoing.318  Even if inflation dissipates gradually over a longer time 
period, an investor is still damaged because he cannot recover the full 
amount of inflation reflected in the security at the time of purchase.319  
Thus, some argue that the gradual dissipation of inflation through a 
“growing quiet awareness” of the fraud is a theory that warrants 
recovery.320
For example, plaintiffs have argued that concealed risks materialize when 
a company announced poor financial results that are alleged to reveal the 
company’s “true financial condition.”
 
321  The In re Williams court required 
the plaintiffs’ expert to establish proof of the mechanism by which the risk 
materialized, and ultimately rejected this loss causation model.322  As the 
district court noted, materialization of the risk is a theory of proof, “not an 
excuse for lack of evidence of loss causation.”323 An expert must identify 
when the materialization of the concealed risk occurred, and link that 
materialization to the corresponding loss.324
 
 316. See id.; see also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 352, 364 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
  Commentators note that where 
 317. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“By contrast, where the alleged misstatement is an intentionally false opinion, the market 
will not respond to the truth until the falsity is revealed—i.e. a corrective disclosure.”). 
 318. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 102–03 (noting that when journalists or analysts 
remark on a corporation’s improprieties, the facts underlying these disclosures may fall 
within a scheme of greater wrongdoing).  Events such as earnings restatements or warnings 
could substantiate this theory of loss causation. See id. at 102. 
 319. See id. at 103. 
 320. See Fox, supra note 20, at 851; Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 103. 
 321. See Thorsen et al., supra note 70, at 102; see also In re Williams Sec. Litig.-WCG 
Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (10th Cir. 2009).  In In re Williams, the plaintiffs’ expert 
attributed 98 percent of the value of the stock to the concealed fraud, and that the truth of the 
company’s poor financial health was revealed to the market through “leakage.” Id. at 1134–
35. 
 322. The court held: 
A plaintiff cannot simply state that the market had learned the truth by a certain 
date and, because the learning was a gradual process, attribute all prior losses to 
the revelation of the fraud.  The inability to point to a single corrective disclosure 
does not relieve the plaintiff of showing how the truth was revealed; he cannot say, 
“Well, the market must have known.” 
558 F.3d at 1138.  Because the plaintiffs’ expert alleged that a trickle of information entered 
into the marketplace over a nineteen-month period, the court quoted Dura for the proposition 
that “[o]ther things being equal, the longer the time between the purchase and sale, the more 
likely that . . . other factors caused the loss.” Id. at 1139 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 343). 
 323. In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1265 (N.D. Okla. 2007), aff’d, 558 
F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 324. The court also rejected bankruptcy as a corrective disclosure, since the zone of risk 
within the misrepresentation “is not infinite.” In re Williams, 558 F.3d at 1142–43 (“[T]here 
are simply too many potential intervening causes to say that bankruptcy was WCG’s legally 
foreseeable destiny such that its trading price at bankruptcy equaled its true value . . . .”).  
Sometimes, corporations reveal bundles of negative news on the same day.  Courts reject 
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a stock price declines gradually over a long period, a leakage theory might 
enable plaintiffs to claim damages each day the stock price declined, since 
they need not establish a concrete mechanism for market realization of the 
truth.325  Crafting a theory of causation becomes extremely difficult over 
long class periods with many alleged misstatements.326
D.  A Morass of Misstatements:  Linking Damages Models 
to Specific Misrepresentations 
 
Class action plaintiffs often allege many fraudulent statements over long 
class periods.327  Multiple corrective disclosures complicate these 
allegations, with inflation increasing after some misstatements, remaining 
constant after others, and then gradually decreasing.328  Calculations of 
inflation are further complicated by different theories of disclosure for 
multiple misstatements.329  Naturally, a jury can rule in either the 
defendants’ or the plaintiffs’ favor for each misstatement.330  An expert’s 
carefully constructed inflation model can be undermined if the jury finds 
that not all of the alleged misstatements are actionable.331  Hypothetically, 
the plaintiffs’ expert could opine that the defendant’s stock price was 
artificially inflated by the first misstatement, and a later misstatement 
additionally inflated the stock.  If the jury rules in the defendants’ favor on 
one misstatement and in the plaintiffs’ favor on another, it is unclear 
whether the inflation attributed to the first misstatement is wiped out, or if 
the entire amount of inflation is transferred to the later misstatement.332  
The few courts that have considered these issues have adopted a flexible 
approach deferential to the jury’s findings.333
 
expert analysis that does not disaggregate the negative news related to the fraud from news 
unrelated to fraud. See In re BankAtlantic Bancorp. Sec. Litig., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 




 325. Pietrzak & McLaughlin, supra note 23. 
 326. See infra Part III.D. 
 327. The PSLRA requires that plaintiffs specify each misleading statement for which they 
seek relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005); Burch, supra note 15, at 357. 
 328. See supra Part III.A; infra Part III.E. 
 329. See supra Part III.C. 
 330. See Daniel H. Gold, Loss Causation at the Proof Stage 5 Years After Dura, 29 SEC. 
REFORM ACT LITIG. REP. 5, 11 (2010). 
 331. See id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (citing Castillo v. Envoy Corp., 206 F.R.D. 464, 472 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)) (noting that 
where plaintiffs’ inflation band did not correspond directly to fifty-seven misstatements, 
“courts have suggested that a misstatement may cause inflation simply by maintaining 
existing market expectations, even if it does not actually cause the inflation in the stock price 
to increase on the day the statement is made”). 
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E.  Lost at Sea?  Three Recent Verdicts 
Few securities class actions ever see trial, and even fewer reach a jury 
verdict.334  This Note focuses on three recent verdicts in securities class 
actions that have important loss causation implications.335  The federal 
courts have a long history of according great deference to jury verdicts,336 
but these juries’ findings did not logically follow the parties’ evidence of 
causation and damages.337
1.  The Household Verdict 
 
Beginning in August 2002, individual plaintiffs filed a series of 
complaints against Household International, Inc. and several of its officers, 
among others.338  Household was a publicly traded corporation in the 
business of consumer lending.339
 
 334. See Savett, supra note 
  Those complaints alleged that Household 
25; see also Peter Lattman, A Rare Species:  The Securities-
Fraud Class-Action Trial, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2007, 3:07 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/10/24/a-rare-species-the-securities-fraud-class-action-trial/. 
 335. These three verdicts could ultimately yield billions of dollars in damages. See 
Andrew M. Harris, HSBC Faces Fraud Trial over Predecessor’s Lending (Update2), 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2009, 6:46 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aXGHk_IncBoQ; supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 336. See Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (“Courts are 
not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could 
have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are 
more reasonable.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50; Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518–19 
(1995) (“A jury verdict expresses a collective judgment that we may fairly presume to reflect 
the considered view of the community.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 337. A fourth class action, In re BankAtlantic Bancorp. Securities Litigation, reached a 
jury verdict in November 2010, following four weeks of trial. No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 
1585605, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011).  The jury found some defendants liable for some, 
but not all, of the alleged misstatements. See id.  On April 25, 2011, the court vacated the 
verdict, holding that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to prove loss 
causation. See id. at *14–22.  The crux of the defendants’ post-trial arguments concerned 
testimony by the plaintiffs’ expert related to causation and damages. See id.; see also id. at 
*4 (quoting defendants’ argument that “[t]his is a case based on [the plaintiffs’ expert’s] 
broad-brush assumptions”).  The plaintiffs proceeded on a materialization-of-the-risk theory, 
and the jury found for liability on one of two possible damages periods. See id. at *6, *15–
16.  The verdict—and therefore the court’s resolution of the defendants’ post-trial motion—
“hinged” on the jury’s finding regarding the release of a bundle of negative information on 
the materialization date. Id. at *18–19.  However, that negative information pertained to both 
fraud-related and non-fraudulent conduct. Id. at *18.  At trial, the plaintiffs’ expert “freely 
admitted” that she assumed that the entire negative bundle related to the fraud. Id. at *19.  
She did not disaggregate the effect of the negative fraud-related information from the effect 
of the non-fraudulent information. Id.  Because the jury rejected the plaintiffs’ assumption, 
its findings were necessarily fatal to proof of causation, and the court vacated the jury’s 
findings of liability for this period of damages. See id. at *21.  Though this decision 
articulated some of the problems with proof of causation, this Note focuses on three other 
verdicts.  In those three verdicts, juries applied causation models over longer time periods, 
decided many more misstatements than those at issue in In re BankAtlantic, or made findings 
of fact utterly inconsistent with the economic theory supporting the courts’ causation and 
damages jurisprudence. 
 338. See Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 5893, 2004 
WL 574665, at *1, *14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2004). 
 339. See id. at *2. 
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violated the federal securities laws by failing to report that it manipulated 
delinquent loans to appear solvent, and that it engaged in predatory 
lending.340  After Household’s auditors recommended that it significantly 
restate its earnings, and news of a possible state class action settlement 
became public, the plaintiffs filed suit.341  The court certified the class in 
2004342
On May 7, 2009, the jury returned a mixed verdict in favor of the 
plaintiffs.
 and the matter ultimately went to trial. 
343  The jury found Household liable for seventeen of a total of 
forty alleged misstatements, exonerating all the defendants on the first 
thirteen misstatements and deciding per-day, per-share dollar inflation for 
each day of the class period.344  Loss causation was a heavily litigated issue 
in the case, and it featured prominently in the parties’ post-trial 
submissions.345
After the verdict, Household moved for judgment as a matter of law.
 
346  
The verdict form required the jury to select a model of loss causation 
proffered by the plaintiffs’ expert that “reasonably estimate[d]” damages, if 
it found the defendants liable for any of the misstatements.347  The jury 
selected the leakage model,348 and found no share price inflation until the 
date of the first misstatement for which they determined the defendants 
liable, March 23, 2001.349
 
 340. See id. 
  On that date, however, the jury attributed the 
 341. See id. 
 342. See Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 5893, 2006 
WL 1120522, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2006). 
 343. See Verdict Form, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 
Civ. 5893 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2009), ECF No. 1611 [hereinafter Household Verdict Form]; 
LaCroix, supra note 26.  This trial was only the seventh securities class action based on post-
PSLRA conduct to reach a verdict. See Savett, supra note 25.  The action proceeded to a 
second phase for determination of damages and individual reliance issues. See Lawrence E. 
Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
 344. See Household Verdict Form, supra note 343, at 1–40; id. tbl.B.; LaCroix, supra 
note 26. 
 345. See Consolidated Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motions for 
Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Rule 50(b) or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial 
Pursuant to Rule 59 at 4–14, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 
Civ. 5893 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2009), ECF No. 1650 [hereinafter Household Rule 50 Motion]; 
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to 
Rule 50(b) or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 at 3–12, Lawrence E. 
Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int’l, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 5893 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2009), ECF 
No. 1656 [hereinafter Opposition to Household Rule 50 Motion]. 
 346. See Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345.  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(a), the court may order judgment as a matter of law after a party has been fully 
heard on an issue if the court finds that “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient 
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).  If the court 
does not grant a Rule 50(a) motion, the party requesting judgment as a matter of law may 
renew their motion following a verdict. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). 
 347. See Household Verdict Form, supra note 343, at 41 (“[W]rite the amount of loss per 
share, if any, that, according to the model you have chosen, any defendant’s conduct caused 
plaintiffs to suffer on each of the dates . . . .”). 
 348. Id.  The jury declined to select a specific disclosures model put forth by the 
plaintiffs’ expert. See id. 
 349. See id. at 11, 41 & tbl.B (no inflation determined until March 23, 2001, the date of 
the first misstatement). 
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highest amount of inflation claimed by the plaintiffs’ expert throughout the 
class period, even though the plaintiffs’ expert opined that the March 23, 
2001 misstatement only inflated the share price by 67 cents.350  Essentially, 
the jury found the maximum amount of inflation present in Household’s 
stock at the start of liability.351  The jury found that following March 23, 
2001, inflation floated between negative $4.66 and $23.94 per share.352
In its Rule 50 motion, Household attacked these findings, arguing that the 
plaintiffs’ leakage theory was legally defective.
 
353  Because the plaintiffs 
argued that Household’s stock price declined as a result of information 
trickling into the market, rather than through a corrective disclosure, the 
plaintiffs’ damages model could not identify the mechanism for revealing 
the truth.354  If it could not identify this mechanism, it necessarily could not 
disaggregate confounding factors, and thus could not prove loss 
causation.355  Perhaps more importantly, Household argued that the 
plaintiffs’ purported failure to identify a disclosure mechanism could not 
prove loss causation because there was no proof that the stock price 
declines were tied to an earlier misstatement.356  In other words, even if the 
leaked information caused the price drops, the plaintiffs introduced no 
evidence describing exactly what was revealed.357
Household also argued that the jury verdict was irreconcilably 
inconsistent because the jury found that share price inflation actually 
increased on days where there was no misstatement.
 
358  Moreover, the 
defendants objected to the verdict form, which did not require the jury to 
decide which specific elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim were satisfied for 
each misstatement.359
 
 350. See Opposition to Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 
 
345, at 8, 9, 11 (noting 
that plaintiffs’ expert “capped” the quantification to the cumulative residual price decline of 
$23.94); see also id. at 9 n.8 (noting that even though there was no identifiable news during 
one interval in the class period, “inflation declines . . . because of leakage which dissipates 
inflation”); Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 11–12, 29–30 (arguing on 
materiality grounds that the jury’s verdict is fatally inconsistent because fourteen of the 
misstatements for which defendants were found liable—out of a total of seventeen—caused 
no new inflation in the share price). 
 351. See Opposition to Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 8; Household 
Verdict Form, supra note 343, tbl.B. 
 352. See Household Verdict Form, supra note 343, tbl.B.  Inflation remained constant 
until September 6, 2001, then oscillated. See id.  “Negative” inflation occurred beginning in 
September 2002. See id.  Inflation returned to zero dollars on the final day of the class 
period. See id.; see also LaCroix, supra note 26 (noting that “[n]egative share inflation is a 
puzzling concept that . . . will have to be sorted out”). 
 353. See Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 6–10.  Defendants relied on the 
court’s opinion in In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1266–67 (N.D. Okla. 
2007), aff’d, 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009), discussed supra Part III.C. 
 354. See Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 345, at 5. 
 355. Id. 
 356. See id. at 8–10. 
 357. See id. 
 358. See id. at 30. 
 359. See id. at 60–61 (arguing that the legal standard would be better served “by having 
the jury expressly address the predicate loss causation element . . . before turning to the 
ultimate question of liability”).  According to Household, the verdict “produced 
unintelligible findings of liability coupled with zero or negative inflation.” Id. at 61. 
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For their part, the plaintiffs resisted these arguments on the grounds that 
Dura does not require a specific “parsing exercise” between theories of 
liability and inflation; the plaintiffs argued that the jury need not match 
inflation exactly to an expert’s suggested amount; and that the defendants 
waived their objections by failing to request subsequent jury deliberations 
to clarify the alleged defects in the verdict form.360  The court struck 
Household’s motion pending the damages phase of the trial.361
2.  The Vivendi Verdict 
  To date, the 
court has not entered a final judgment. 
In 2002, shareholders of Vivendi Universal, S.A. sued the corporation 
and several of its officers, alleging that Vivendi violated the federal 
securities laws, including Section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act.362  The plaintiffs 
claimed that the defendants misrepresented Vivendi’s liquidity condition 
during a class period stretching from October 2000 to August 2002.363  The 
court certified the matter as a class action in 2007, and trial began in 
October 2009.364
Following a three-month trial, the jury returned its verdict on January 29, 
2010.
 
365  The jury found Vivendi liable for all fifty-seven alleged 
misstatements.366  As in Household, the jury determined inflation on a daily 
per-share basis across the entire class period of approximately 400 days.367  
Vivendi challenged the plaintiffs’ proof of loss causation in a post-trial 
motion.368
At trial, the plaintiffs argued that Vivendi concealed its risk of a liquidity 
crisis, and the plaintiffs’ expert opined that those risks materialized over 




 360. See Opposition to Household Rule 50 Motion, supra note 
  Those events were primarily 
345, at 12. 
 361. Notification of Docket Entry at 1, Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household 
Int’l, Inc., 02 Civ. 5893 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 2010), ECF No. 1696. 
 362. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 363. See id.; see also id. at 537–43 (detailing the evidence supporting defendants’ 
misrepresentations of its liquidity condition); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 634 
F. Supp. 2d 352, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on loss causation). 
 364. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 522–23. 
 365. See id. at 520–21; Verdict Form, In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 
Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2010), ECF No. 998 [hereinafter Vivendi Verdict Form]; 
Koppel, supra note 26. 
 366. See Vivendi Verdict Form, supra note 365, at 1–57.  The jury attributed no liability 
to the co-defendants. See id. at 69. 
 367. See id. at 58-68.  Unlike in Household, the Vivendi verdict form required jurors to 
find that the plaintiffs proved each element of their Section 10(b) claims for each of the fifty-
seven misstatements. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 368. See Consolidated Memorandum of Law in Support of Vivendi, S.A.’s Renewed 
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Rule 50(b), or, in the Alternative, for a 
New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 26–42, In re 
Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 5571 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010), ECF No. 
1022 [hereinafter, Vivendi Rule 50 Motion]; see also supra note 346 and accompanying text 
(discussing the standard of review of post-trial motions). 
 369. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
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unexpected asset sales or downgrades of Vivendi’s debt by the ratings 
agencies.370  Rather than conducting an event study to ascertain what 
disclosures inflated the value of the security, the plaintiffs’ event study 
examined the gradual materialization of the fraud over those nine dates.371  
The defendants introduced evidence that the market was aware of the 
information released on those dates, so the price drops on the nine 
materialization dates that purportedly revealed the fraud could not be 
attributable to the disclosures.372  This is an application of the “truth on the 
market” doctrine; if disclosures reveal old news, they cannot impact the 
market price of the security or cause any losses.373  The defendants 
introduced evidence that the market knew of Vivendi’s poor cash flow, high 
debt load, and other liquidity risks prior to the materialization dates in 
2002.374  Additionally, the defendants sought to rebut the plaintiffs’ 
evidence with testimony that the plaintiffs’ expert did not conduct a proper 
event study, and that the losses on the materialization dates did not 
correspond to the revelation of the fraud, but to unrelated industry-wide or 
market-wide declines.375
The trial’s causation issues related to the jury’s damage findings.  The 
plaintiffs submitted daily calculations of per-share damages to the jury.
  Thus, this “counter-event” study sought to 
identify superseding causes that would stifle the plaintiffs’ Dura analysis. 
376  
The jury’s ultimate findings roughly halved the amount of inflation 
proffered by the plaintiffs’ expert.377  For example, the jury found that there 
was per-share inflation of €2.40 on September 10, 2001, then again on 
October 1, 2001.378  Interestingly, the jury found that there was zero stock 
price inflation between those dates,379
 
 370. See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d 586, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 yet there was no intervening 
 371. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 561. 
 372. See Transcript of Trial at 6521:12–6522:19, 6531:8–6542:17, In re Vivendi 
Universal S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter Vivendi Trial 
Transcript] (testimony of Ronald Gilson). 
 373. See, e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 374. See Vivendi Trial Transcript, supra note 372, at 6521:12–6522:19, 6531:8–6542:17 
(testimony of Ronald Gilson). 
 375. See Vivendi Trial Transcript, supra note 372, at 6264:16–6266:25, 6267:1–25, 
6274:17–6275:19 (testimony of William Silber).  The defendants’ expert conducted his own 
event study, and then testified that the plaintiffs did not “separate out the alleged 
misrepresentations from other news,” thus returning an incorrect measure of inflation. See 
Vivendi Trial Transcript, supra note 372, at 6264:16–6266:25, 6274:17–6275:19 (testimony 
of William Silber) (testifying that plaintiffs’ expert, among other things, did not use a proper 
control period or a correct measure of volatility). 
 376. See Vivendi Trial Transcript, supra note 372, at 7437:17–7438:20; Vivendi Verdict 
Form, supra note 365, at 58–68. 
 377. See In re Vivendi 765 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 378. See Vivendi Verdict Form, supra note 365, at 63. 
 379. See id.; see also Vivendi Rule 50 Motion, supra note 368, at 30 n.23.  In its Rule 50 
motion, Vivendi argued that since inflation returned to zero on September 11, 2001, the class 
period must end on that date. See id. at 26–29 (arguing that Vivendi’s lone concealed risk—a 
liquidity crisis—was fully known to the market since, according to the jury’s findings of 
fact, inflation returned to zero on eight separate dates during the class period).  Vivendi also 
put forth arguments that the plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to satisfy the 
Second Circuit’s “zone of risk” test as articulated in In re Omnicom Group, Inc. Securities 
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disclosure.380  Effectively, a class member who purchased Vivendi stock on 
September 10, 2001 and then sold before October 1, 2001 was damaged by 
fraud, even though there was no event that would trigger the dissipation.381  
Vivendi argued that this “compromise” verdict was impermissible, and 
demanded a new trial.382
On February 17, 2011, the district court largely denied Vivendi’s Rule 50 
motion, rejecting the defendants’ loss causation arguments.
 
383  In its 
decision, the court held that a reasonable juror could have concluded that 
the fraud materialized on the nine dates proffered by the plaintiffs.384  The 
court noted that the concealed risks were reasonably remote to those who 
believed the fraud; for example, the plaintiffs put forth evidence that certain 
materialization events “surprised” market analysts.385  The matter is still 
pending final judgment, though Vivendi has indicated that it will appeal.386
3.  The Apollo Verdict 
 
A third class action, In re Apollo Group, Inc. Securities Litigation,387 
reached a jury verdict on January 16, 2008.388  Apollo Group, Inc. is the 
parent company of the University of Phoenix, a for-profit university.389  
The plaintiffs alleged that Apollo made misstatements related to an 
investigation by the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) into the 
University of Phoenix’s possible violations of DOE regulations.390  The 
district court eventually overturned the verdict because the facts of the 
alleged corrective disclosure, an analyst report dealing with the DOE 
investigation, had previously been disclosed in articles in the Wall Street 
Journal and the Chicago Tribune discussing the contents of a DOE 
report.391
 
Litigation, 597 F.3d 501, 511 (2d Cir. 2010). See Vivendi Rule 50 Motion, supra note 
  Apollo’s stock price had not reacted to the prior news articles, 
368, 
at 31–39.  The court ultimately rejected Vivendi’s arguments. See In re Vivendi, 765 
F. Supp. 2d at 563–67. 
 380. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 564–65. 
 381. Cf. id.  As a corollary, purchasers who bought between September 10 and 29 would 
theoretically have no damages at all, since they did not buy artificially inflated shares (even 
though the markets closed for some of the period following the 9/11 attacks). 
 382. Vivendi Rule 50 Motion, supra note 368, at 45–46 (arguing that the jury was 
“completely at sea” when it made its “compromise” loss causation findings and citing cases 
reversing compromise jury verdicts that have no basis in the evidence). 
 383. See In re Vivendi, 765 F. Supp. 2d 512. 
 384. See id. at 560–61. 
 385. See id. at 556–57. 
 386. See Press Release, Vivendi, S.A., Vivendi Will Appeal to Overturn Jury Verdict 
(Jan. 29, 2010), available at http://www.vivendi.com/vivendi/Vivendi-Will-Appeal-to-
Overturn. 
 387. No. CV-04-2147, 2008 WL 3072731, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 4, 2008), rev’d and 
remanded, No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir. June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1602 (2011). 
 388. See Transcript of Trial at 4111:16–4120:14, In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 
CV-04-2147, 2008 WL 3072731 (D. Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008). 
 389. See In re Apollo, 2008 WL 3072731, at *1. 
 390. See id. 
 391. See id. at *3–4 (noting the rarity of a situation where the corrective facts are 
“obfuscated in such a way, or are of such complexity, as to require someone to connect the 
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and only suffered a statistically significant price drop after publication of 
the analyst report.392  In overturning the verdict, the district court held that 
since the analyst report contained no new information, it could not be 
corrective.393  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and 
restored the jury verdict.394  Apollo petitioned the Supreme Court for 
certiorari to consider whether liability for a stock price decline that occurred 
a week after the news first became public was consistent with the 
presumption of an efficient market underlying FOTM cases,395 and whether 
the analyst report, as a re-characterization of previously disclosed facts, 
could constitute a corrective disclosure.396  This presented the Supreme 
Court with an opportunity to resolve the longstanding tension between the 
economic theory that facilitated class actions and theories of causation, and 
the common law principles born out of a different era of litigation.  The 
Supreme Court declined this opportunity.  On March 7, 2011, the Court 
denied certiorari, leaving the standard of proof of loss causation open to the 
lower federal courts.397
IV.  THE INQUIRY, COLLAPSED:  THE COURTS MUST DEVELOP RULES FOR 
PROOF OF LOSS CAUSATION 
 
The Household, Vivendi, and Apollo verdicts illustrate unique issues of 
loss causation.  Those trials produced mountains of evidence, competing 
experts, and, most likely, confused juries.  Given the conceptual complexity 
of loss causation, the losing parties will invariably move for post-trial relief.  
This Note suggests that courts should develop anticipatory bright-line rules 
to deal with post-trial challenges to jury findings of causation and damages.  
These trials have incredible economic consequences,398
Courts have historically accorded great deference to jury verdicts, so it is 
perhaps not surprising that jury findings are rarely disturbed.  The results of 
all three of these trials, however, compel courts to find, as a matter of law, 
that there is no loss causation without an identifiable mechanism for 
disclosure that is quickly absorbed by the market, and that is connected to 
 and the courts 
should adopt causation rules that are more consistent with economic theory. 
 
dots for a bewildered market” but holding that a re-characterization of previously disclosed 
facts could sometimes be corrective). But see In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 
501, 512 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A negative journalistic characterization of previously disclosed 
facts does not constitute a corrective disclosure . . . .”). 
 392. See In re Apollo, 2008 WL 3072731, at *1. 
 393. See id. at *3–4. 
 394. See In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988, at *1 (9th 
Cir. June 23, 2010) (holding that a reasonable juror could have concluded that the challenged 
analyst reports were corrective disclosures). 
 395. The Basic Inc. v. Levinson Court explicitly declined to address this issue. See 485 
U.S. 224, 248 n.28 (1988); supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 396. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at *i (arguing that a circuit split 
exists on the issue of the immediacy of market reaction to a disclosure as well as to whether 
a re-characterization of previously disclosed facts constitutes a corrective disclosure). 
 397. Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) 
(denying certiorari). 
 398. See supra notes 13, 26 and accompanying text. 
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earlier misstatements.  Consistent with the purposes of the securities laws, 
with the FOTM theory, and with the benefit of hindsight following three 
confused verdicts, this Note encourages the courts to tighten the causation 
standard. 
A.  Unpredictable Liability Does Not Serve the Legislative Goals of the 
Securities Laws 
If one of the legislative purposes of the securities laws is transparency, 
the overriding goal of the Rule 10b-5 suit must be deterrence.399  
Accordingly, the law should create rules that provide a reliable measure of 
liability for market participants.400  By definition, unpredictable liability 
does nothing to deter corporate mischief.401  In Vivendi and Household, the 
juries’ findings of share price inflation on a per-day basis did not match the 
evidence adduced at trial.402  The juries determined that the defendants 
made actionable misrepresentations, and were therefore liable, but the 
difficulties inherent in linking specific misstatements to inflation resulted in 
chaotic verdicts.403  The Supreme Court’s landmark Dura decision requires 
the plaintiffs to prove that a material misstatement inflated the market value 
of a security, thereby tainting the investment with fraud.404  The loss 
occurs, if at all, when the market learns the truth about the material 
misstatement; the market quickly absorbs that information and investors 
bear the corresponding loss.405  The securities laws protect investors from 
fraud, and do not exist to insure investors from all loss.406
These verdicts, though they may ultimately yield billions of dollars in 
damages for shareholders,
 
407 exonerate defendants of some misconduct, but 
impose liability for statements they never made.408  A plaintiff’s verdict 
may provide redress for some aggrieved shareholders, but complex cases 
require more detailed findings, and the results of these recent trials will not 
entirely dissuade future wrongdoers.409  The courts must fashion rules that 
strengthen the logical connection between liability and measurable loss to 
prevent further irrational verdicts; in short, the courts must effect 
conceptual clarity.  They can accomplish this by designing a rule requiring 
that specific alleged misstatements are linked to a later loss caused by an 
identifiable disclosure mechanism.410
 
 399. See supra notes 
  This solution can be extrapolated 
64, 229 and accompanying text. 
 400. See Burch, supra note 15, at 380–86; supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
 401. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
 402. See supra Part III.E.1–2. 
 403. See supra Part III.E.1–2; note 382 and accompanying text. 
 404. See supra notes 208–10 and accompanying text. 
 405. See Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2010); see also supra notes 
104, 210, 266–71 and accompanying text. 
 406. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005). 
 407. See supra notes 26, 335 and accompanying text. 
 408. See supra notes 350–58 and accompanying text. 
 409. See supra notes 350–58 and accompanying text. 
 410. See Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 842–
43 (7th Cir. 2007) (causation must be applied on a statement-by-statement basis); supra Parts 
II.C, III.C–D. 
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from the economic theory that currently dominates class actions and is 
premised on the market’s rapid absorption of information.411
B.  The Bearer of Bad News?  The Market Proves Loss Causation 
 
The modern approach to loss causation depends in large part on the 
definition of a security’s value.412  In Dura, the Court held that at the 
instant of purchase, a stock’s value is equal to its market price.413  Because 
an investor can simply pass the inflation along to another buyer, there has 
been no economic loss.414
FOTM bridges loss causation and reliance, but the two elements remain 
conceptually distinct.
 
415  If securities are purchased in an efficient market, 
the investor assumes that the market has accounted for all available public 
information concerning the issuer, and that the price represents the 
security’s integral value.416  Where an issuer disseminates a misstatement, 
the entire market is fooled until the information is later corrected.417
Putative class action plaintiffs seeking certification typically assert the 
FOTM theory that the Supreme Court upheld in Basic.
 
418  But in Apollo, 
the Ninth Circuit restored a jury verdict that is likely inconsistent with both 
Basic and Dura.419  In Apollo, the defendant’s stock price did not react to 
corrective information published in prominent national newspapers, but 
instead reacted a week later when an analyst published an unflattering 
report.420  The market need not be omniscient, but it rapidly digests all 
public information.421  In Apollo, the market’s initial apathy to the 
newspaper report suggests that there was no loss causation as a matter of 
law.422  The drop in Apollo’s share price occurred much later, only after a 
recharacterization of the old news.423
 
 411. See supra Parts I.C–D. 
  Dura requires a causal connection 
 412. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 255 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that 
the Court’s opinion “implicitly suggests that stocks have some ‘true value’ that is 
measurable by a standard other than their market price”). 
 413. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342; supra Part II.C. 
 414. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342; supra Part II.C. 
 415. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011); In re 
Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509–10 (2d Cir. 2010) (distinguishing 
between different types of loss causation); supra Parts I.C, II.A. 
 416. See supra Part II.A.  The market conducts the valuation of the security that the 
investor in a face-to-face transaction normally would. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 244 (1988) (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)) 
(noting the agency role the market plays for the investor).  Implicit in this judgment is an 
assumption that the integrity of the share price is not clouded by fraud. See id. at 245. 
 417. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
 418. See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text. 
 419. See In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir. 
June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011). 
 420. See supra notes 390–94 and accompanying text. 
 421. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets:  II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1601–02 (1991); 
Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 258, at 192; supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 422. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at *24–30; see also supra Part 
II.A; supra note 177 (discussing the Cammer factors). 
 423. See supra notes 389–93 and accompanying text. 
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between the misstatement, the revelation of the concealed fraud, and the 
loss.  Because only new information can cause a loss, the intervening 
newspaper reports severed the chain of causation between the misstatement 
and the purported corrective disclosure, the analyst report.424
The jury findings in Vivendi and Household suggest a similar 
conclusion.
  This is 
necessarily fatal to the plaintiff’s proof of loss causation. 
425  Without proof of some mechanism that created or revealed 
the fraud,426 inflation or dissipation that is not tied to a disclosure is 
inconsistent with a central tenet of ECMH:  share prices do not arbitrarily 
respond to news.427  The juries’ random inflation findings, coupled with the 
plaintiffs’ leakage model that did not identify disclosure mechanisms or tie 
the loss to earlier misstatements, strongly supports a conclusion that there 
was no proof of loss causation.428
C.  Modern Theory and the Common Law:  The Elements of a Rule 10b-5 
Suit Are Inextricable 
  To avoid incongruous results, courts 
should require plaintiffs to bear the burden of disaggregating superseding 
causes and identify the mechanism that alerted the market to defendants’ 
fraud.  Because disputed issues of fact are ultimately decided by the jury, 
the courts should continue to develop anticipatory rules for considering 
post-trial motions. 
In the market model of a securities class action, materiality, loss 
causation, reliance, and damages collapse into the same issue:  the amount 
of inflation that a misrepresentation causes in the market price of a security, 
and the amount of dissipation that occurs once the market learns the 
truth.429  Courts first used the common law to fill the gaps in Rule 10b-5 
jurisprudence, but soon realized that these principles were not entirely 
adequate to facilitate modern remedies.430  The courts needed more 
practical measures to cope with procedural requirements that might 
otherwise make recovery unavailable to aggrieved parties.431
The unique nature of open-market transactions conducted over large, 
impersonal exchanges, and the special requirements for class action suits, 
forced the courts to apply an economic analysis clothed in the language of 
 
 
 424. See supra notes 126 and accompanying text. 
 425. See supra Part III.E.1–2. 
 426. See supra notes 321–24 and accompanying text. 
 427. See supra notes 121–27 and accompanying text. 
 428. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 511–12 (2d Cir. 2010); 
supra Part I.B.  FOTM made it much easier to maintain a class action, but it should require 
almost instant market reaction to news. See supra Parts I.D, II.A, notes 177, 424 and 
accompanying text.  In other words, “the market cannot be efficient for purposes of 
assimilating a defendants’ fraud immediately into price, and then lazy and unresponsive 
when that fraud is revealed.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 26, at *26–27. 
 429. See Fisher, supra note 290, at 878; Fox, supra note 20, at 845; supra note 259 and 
accompanying text. 
 430. See supra Part II.A, notes 9, 106–12 and accompanying text. 
 431. See supra Parts II.A, II.C, note 150 and accompanying text. 
2011] TIMING IS EVERYTHING 921 
common law deceit.432  The necessity to provide an avenue of redress on a 
mass scale resulted in the courts’ endorsement of economic theory.433
The conflicts between common law fraud and modern securities fraud 
actions continue with loss causation.
 
434  The bifurcation of transaction and 
loss causation, for example, is a modern policy invention that was first 
devised to limit liability.435  The Basic decision permitted the lower courts 
to apply FOTM to create a presumption of reliance; now, the courts can 
also opt to alter the common law proximate cause analogy, which enabled 
broader theories of loss causation, to remain consistent with the ECMH.436
The Dura Court did not have the benefit of hindsight, and judicial 
restraint urged a limited holding.
 
437  However, three recent verdicts may 
force defendants to pay out damages for phantom losses that have little or 
no connection to actual misconduct; on the flip side, these verdicts may also 
deprive investors of their rightful share of damages.438  The mechanisms for 
market realization of the truth remain nebulous, clouding these findings.439  
The common law is not well suited to cope with the modern policy issues 
underlying complex litigation.440  Dura counseled the courts to look to 
causation in deceit actions for guidance, but the common law has very 
apparent limitations.441  The intrinsic differences between traditional 
reliance and the economic theory supporting the FOTM presumption are 
not easily reconciled.442
Loss causation has served well as both a measure of plaintiffs’ injury and 
as a gatekeeping mechanism, but it has not always done so at the proof 
stage.
  Because the results in the three illustrative trials 
do not comport with ECMH, the failure to align losses with a revelation of 
the truth tied to an initial misstatement is fatal. 
443
 
 432. See supra note 
  If it is to be useful at all, FOTM should be available for both 
plaintiffs and defendants at the class certification and proof stages, to 
9 and accompanying text; supra Parts II.A, II.C. 
 433. See supra Part II.A. 
 434. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text. 
 435. See supra notes 76–79, 195 and accompanying text. 
 436. See supra notes 168–73 and accompanying text; see also supra Parts I.B, III.C 
(discussing different theories of loss causation). 
 437. See Fox, supra note 20, at 846; Gillespie, supra note 203, at 172. 
 438. See supra Part III.E; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption?  Why 
the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. LAW. 533, 
533–34 (2005) (published prior to Dura and describing the windfall purchase price inflation 
provides to plaintiffs). 
 439. See supra Part III.E. 
 440. See supra notes 160–66 and accompanying text. But see Fisch, supra note 73, at 
813–14. 
 441. See supra notes 160–66 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.D (discussing 
the class action mechanism of aggregation of claims). 
 442. See supra Part I.B. 
 443. See supra Part III.  Causation issues plagued yet another trial; most recently, a 
district court set aside a jury verdict on loss causation grounds. See In re BankAtlantic 
Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 1585605, at *21 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 
2011) (holding that plaintiffs may prove loss causation “only by producing the testimony of 
an expert who has completed a reliable multiple-regression analysis, event study, and 
financial analysis in order to quantify the extent to which the claimed losses are the result of 
the alleged fraud”); see also supra note 337 (discussing this verdict). 
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demonstrate materiality, causation, and damages.  Any other result would 
produce inconsistency, irrationality, and unfairness.  The courts should 
intervene to uphold the purposes of the securities laws through closer 
adherence to the economic theories that enabled the modern class action, as 
well as to protect the rule of law set by the Supreme Court in Basic and 
Dura. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note attempts to shed some light on one of the most difficult 
conceptual issues in securities litigation.  In Basic and Dura, and more 
recently in Halliburton, the Court painstakingly developed a framework for 
loss causation.  Not surprisingly, causation became hotly contested, and 
litigants incurred substantial costs as a result.  This Note does not propose a 
complete overhaul of a highly complex doctrine, but it does encourage the 
courts to establish consistency by tightening the causation standard to 
match the careful guidance set forth by the Supreme Court, in tandem with 
the economic underpinnings of securities class actions.  By establishing 
bright-line rules for post-trial review, the courts will ensure that the parties 
have met their burden of proving loss causation. 
 
